| Best
Voip Service Providers Chart |
 |
|
$9.95
- $16.58 |
|
 |
|
$19.99
- $39.99 |
|
 |
|
$9.95
- $15.95 |
|
Recent Developments In Nepal's Maoist Insurgency24 February 2006
Recent Developments In Nepal's MaoistInsurgency: Precursor To Decisive Phase? By M.R.Josse
(Paper delivered at InternationalInstitute of Social History, Amsterdam, 9 February 2006 at aworkshop on Maoist Insurgencies in Asia and Latin America:Comparativeperspectives, 9-11 February 2006, organised bythe International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) ofLeiden University in cooperation with the InternationalInstitute for Social History (ISSH), Amsterdam, theNetherlands. )
Introduction
Kathmandu, 19 Feb:This paper focuses on recent developments, vis-à-vis Nepal'sMaoist insurgency, especially the past one year, whileproviding an overview of its genesis, social and politicalroots and locale.
While a substantial body of literaturehas emerged on the latter, commensurate attention has notbeen accorded the former. That is striking in that theinsurgency has ostensibly entered into what is perhaps itsmost decisive or crucial phase, not necessarily in itsfavour.
Not enough mindfulness has probed its fascinatingtransformation from a largely indigenous Nepal-basedmovement into one with robust transnational connections.Many have surfaced in the past year or so.
Adequateresearch has not gone into its equally revealingmetamorphosis from an "anti-Indian" revolutionarynationalist force -- formally known as the Communist Party ofNepal, Maoist (CPN-M) -- into one viewed as a virtual ally ofthe Indian establishment.
No less attention should bedirected to King Gyanendra's decision of February 1, 2005 totake direct control of the affairs of state.
SECTIONONE
Genesis
Its origins can be traced to theestablishment of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) byPuspha Lal Shrestha in Calcutta [now Kolkata], India on 15September 1949. The Communist Party of Nepal, following itslegalisation in 1955, maintained a low profile until thefirst general elections in 1959.
Following convolutedleadership changes, splits and schisms developed.Physically, the Maoist insurgency was launched by theunderground CPN (M) on 13 February 1966 under the rubric ofJana Yuddha or People's War. Conceptually, it was formedwhen in 1994 the CPN (Unity Centre) group led by Prachanda,aka Pushpa Kamal Dahal, and Baburam Bhattarai decided toseparate from that led by Nirmal Lama.
The Communistmovement in Nepal underwent further mutations, including inearly 1990, when a popular campaign geared to overthrow thepartyless Panchayat polity based on an active Monarchy.Three Communist groupings came together to form the SamyuktaJana Morcha (SJM) which participated in the 1991 generalelection. (1)
It secured 9 seats in the 205-member Houseof Representatives making it the third largest party afterthe Nepali Congress (NC) with 110 seats and the CommunistParty of Nepal, Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) with 69seats. (2)
Bhattarai was named party chairman. "In May1994, the party split into an Unity Centre led by Prachandaand another led by Nirmal Lama." (3) The latter was "notparticularly in favour of an armed uprising immediately."(4) In 1995, the SJM split, following radicalisation of itsrevolutionary wing. It was then that Prachanda and Bhattaraiset up the CPN (M). (5)
Currently, Prachanda is theparty's chief ideologue, Commander-in-Chief of the People'sLiberation Army of Nepal and its organisational brain. InFebruary 2001, the Party Central Committee, in recognitionof his seminal leadership role, endorsed Prachanda Path, orPrachanda's Way, as constituting the party's guidingprinciple. (6)
Prachanda Path has been described as "acombination of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism advocating a dualstrategy of simultaneous armed conflict and urban massuprising" (7) with mass uprising being spearheaded by frontorganisations of students, women, farmers and labourunions.
In an interview to A World to Win on 28 May 2001Prachanda himself expounded on his philosophy, thus:
TheParty considers Prachanda Path as an enrichment ofMarxism-Leninism-Maoism.
Giving it concrete definition theConference has termed Prachanda Path as a set of ideas thatis more than a general Party line but which has not yetdeveloped into the level of 'Thought'. The Party has definedPrachanda Path in the Nepali context as a new link ofcreative Marxism, opposed to both the right revisionists andsectarian dogmatists. (8)
He went on to predict that "theParty is confident that the synthesis of Prachanda Path willserve the world revolution by giving direction to theforward march of the Nepali revolution." (9)
In a morerecent exegesis he has further explained the CPM (M)ideology and ultimate goal. He declared that "the basicpolitical strategy of the Party is to free the Nepalesesociety from feudalism and imperialism through the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution" (10) and that "the military strategyof People's War (PW) is objectively based on the goal ofachieving this political strategy." (11)
He has alsostressed the value of flexibility in political tactics,explaining that "in the light of the particularity of thetotal international situation and the prevailing balance ofpower within the country, the Party has been pursuing a[sic] very flexible political tactics." (12) Incidentally,Prachanda has also lashed out at the establishment "byappeasing and kowtowing mainly to American imperialism."(13)
Bhattarai, as SJM chairman, on 4 February 1996presented a 40-point charter of demands related to"nationalism, democracy and livelihood" of the Nepalesepeople to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, then heading aNC-led coalition.
In his 4 February 1996 roster ofconditions Bhattarai declared that unless the governmenttook positive steps towards fulfilling those stipulations by17 February 1996 they would launch an armed struggle.However, four days before the expiry of that ultimatum,their guerrillas fired the first salvos of their People'sWar by attacking police outposts in Rukum, Rolpa, Gorkha andSidhuli districts. (14)
>From then on, it has raged fornearly 10 full years now with a toll in precious human livesreaching about 13,000.
Social/Political Roots andLocale
Politicians, academics and journalists havesuggested a plethora of root causes. One commonly identifiedcause is the "poverty in a nation that is 85 percent rural,and the failure of the government to institute land reformmeasures following the restoration of representativegovernment in 1990." (15)
A menu of contributory factorsand non-causes that have been identified in 2003 by RobertGersony, an American scholar, deserve particular attention.He had focussed on six most Maoist insurgency-affecteddistricts -- namely Rolpa, Rukum, Surkhet, Salyan, Banke andBardiya. While some of them go against conventional wisdom,they are credible and worth consideration. Topping his listis the personality and contribution of Mohan BikramSingh.
In the academic's opinion: "Had it not been for hisearly efforts in Thawang [a village in northern Rolpa], itis not altogether certain that the Maoists would have had abase from which to launch their revolt." (16) Also listed isthat it was six years before the government mobilised theRoyal Nepal Army (RNA).
Gersony maintains: "While not aroot cause of the conflict, the decision not to mobilize asubstantive challenge to the revolt permitted the Maoists tomultiply their forces, skills and geographical impact,exponentially." (17) He provides four past instances where"the few previous armed challenges to the government inNepal's modern history had been met swiftly and effectivelywith armed force, at times followed by negotiations."(18)
Regarding caste and ethnicity as proximate causes,Gersony does not give it as much credence as many others. Hedemolishes the theory that Magars form the backbone of theMaoist cadre. He affirms that this ethnic group whoconstitute more than 7 percent of Nepal's population andrepresent the largest ethnic grouping in general, do notsupport the Maoists.
Neither, he affirms, do the "greatmajority of the Tharus", who constitute the second largestethnic group. According to him, they "do not appear tosupport the Maoist movement." (19) Another oft-mentionedcause is exclusion from the coveted civil service of ethnicand caste groups/minorities.
This could be a possiblecause as, according to an unidentified university expertquoted and based on the latter's reading of a 1834 survey onthe subject, "in 137 years, the lower status half of theNepali population gained only 5 percent share of thesought-after positions." (20)
In Gersony's opinion,although "the Maoist movement has its heartland in apredominantly Magar area -- in part because of historicalaccidents like M.B. (Mohan Bikram) Singh's six-month sojournthere in the 1950s" he argues that "at its core it is not apredominantly a Magar ethnic movement." (21) Indeed, in hisview, "the ethnic and caste dimension is a contributory,facilitating factor of the Maoist revolt, not a principal,core or defining element of the movement." (22)
Electionabuses in 1991 by the Nepali Congress particularly againstthe SJM, from which the Maoist group emerged in 1995, havealso been cited as a possible contributory cause. Yet,Gersony's study discounts it, among other reasons, because"three of the four parliamentary seats at stake in the 1991Rolpa and Rukum elections were won" by the SJM candidates.(23) Similarly, "in the 1992 local elections in Rolpa,[Samyukta] Jana Morcha won 27 (53 percent) of the 53 VDC[Village Development Committee] chairmanships, and thecontrol of the District Council chairmanship."(24)
Alleged post-election persecution of SJM activists inRolpa and Rukum by NC leaders has also been widely suggestedas a contributory cause. Gersony's findings would appear tolend credence to those claims. He says, "the NC leaders tookthe opportunity to use the power of government toarbitrarily prosecute the [Samyukta] Jana Morcha Party inRolpa and Rukum, in part with the aim of strengthening NC'spolitical position in the districts." (25)
Interestingly,that seems to be corroborated by Amik Sherchan, a SJM MPafter the 1991 election, presently chairman of JanamorchaNepal (JN) party. He has gone on public record tocategorically declare: "If it hadn't been for Girija PrasadKoirala [prime minister-NC] and Khum Bahadur Khadka [homeminister -- NC], there would perhaps be no Maoist war."(26)
Gersony has established a few other contributorycauses. They include the "SIJA campaign" (SIJA being anacronym of Sisne peak and Jaljala shrine, familiarKham-Magar symbols) of 1994 in much of what would become theRed Zone and other areas of Rolpa. Conducted under thedirection of military commander, Ram Bahadur Thapa akaBadal, one of the most senior Magars of the Maoist movement,it was focussed on long-term consciousness-raising andpolitical mobilisation.
Another contributory cause isconsidered to be the launch of "Operation Romeo" in November1995, basically an anti-Maoist police operation in Rolpaunder the supervision of Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadkaof the NC, during Sher Bahadur Deuba's coalitiongovernment.
Baburam Bhattarai described it as a reign ofterror against Rolpa peasants. Since the Maoist decision tolaunch their "people's war" was determined as far back asSeptember 1995 following a Central Committee meeting of theCPN (M), Operation Romeo cannot, justifiably, be consideredas a contributory cause.
However, Operation Romeo, thatmainly affected Rolpa, "heightened tensions, projected anegative image of the police, and alienated ordinary ruralresidents. But it was conducted in the context of what bythen was an inevitable armed conflict." (27)
The Americanresearcher discounts one popular view -- that disillusionmentwith multi-party democracy following a few years of the1991/1992 elections fuelled, if not actually gave birth to,the Maoist insurgency.
A caveat must be entered here. Itis this: that theory could be discounted had it notcoincided with mind-boggling corruption, rank politicalopportunism and a succession of revolving-door governments.In such circumstances, recourse to armed revolutionarychange must have seemed an attractive proposition to verymany, especially in the neglected, isolatedhinterlands.
There is no doubt that the failure of theDeuba government to extend the tenure of local officialsseveral weeks after the dissolution of the House ofRepresentatives in May 2002 is an important contributorycause. As rightly put:
By failing to extend their tenures,the NC government caused the collapse of therepresentational system leaving behind a political vacuum inthe midst of an armed political struggle. Through thismeasure, it achieved what the Maoists had been attempting toaccomplish since the outset: to empty the rural areas oflocal elected leaders who opposed them and to diminish thegovernment's presence at a moment when it was mostcritically needed. (28)
Other proximate causes
There is,however, no particular dearth of other explanations for theMaoist revolt. For reasons of brevity, I will now summarisethem without specific identification of authorship.
Thoseof a functional or structural nature, at the subalternlevel, have often been identified as deprivation,ethno-cultural grievances, and economic disparities.However, considering that all those "causes" have beenextant since the founding of Nepal as a nation-state in1769, this observer is not convinced that they, per se,constitute the core contributory factors.
Attempts havebeen made to locate its causes within the structure of asemi-feudal state, regional hegemony and global capitalisticimperialism. Scholars have also attempted to linkunemployment, underemployment, and poverty in general, asbeing instrumental. Notably, those do not fully explain thetiming of the implosion of the "people's war" in 1996, itstheoretical underpinnings in 1994 or the actual 'birth' ofthe CPN (M) in 1995.
Arguably, the theory that Nepal'sincreasingly young and restless population had more than acasual bearing on the Maoist insurrection is far morecredible. That is because the greening of her population,and the gap between that population and employmentopportunities, has been particularly striking over the pastdecade or so, coinciding more or less with the "people'swar".
In any case, the exodus of Nepal's youth foremployment and study opportunities abroad over this timeperiod and that of a parallel movement from the urbancentres to the Maoist heartland isnoteworthy.
Incidentally, remittances, estimated atmillions of dollars by the Asian Development Bank, from some1.2 million Nepalese migrant workers -- dispersed through theGulf, the Middle East, Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong or SouthKorea -- have helped shore up the insurgency-hit nationaleconomy, although it may not match the conflict-relatedloss.
On the other hand, the moral support to the Maoistcause from many young educated Nepalese, particularly in theaffluent or capitalistic countries of the West, has helpedboost their morale, though its value is difficult toquantify. These are the children of the 1990s who sawfree-market economics and popular democracy breed greater,not bridge, social disparities.
Like the Maoists who areInternet savvy and know how to extract the maximumpropaganda value from modern technological tools, includingcell phones and FM stations, many of them have helped topaint a humane face to the brutal Maoist insurgency. By andlarge, they have sought to demonize the targets of Maoistire, principally the Monarchy and the RNA. In their terrortactics the Maoists have made liberal use of the tools andconcepts of globalisation: information, travel and trade, asalso of new ideas and appealing public relations.
Not afew have attempted to project the 1990 Constitution, withthe embedded concept of Nepal as a Hindu state, as animportant proximate cause. Indeed, the demand for a secularstate figures in the 40-point Maoist list.
Notably, theseven party alliance (SPA), now linked with the Maoistsunder the terms of their 22 November 2005 understandingforged in India, has come around to doing so. This isdespite the fact that the Communist leaders who had joinedhands with the NC in 1990 to topple the Panchayat edificewere among the principal drafters of the 1990Constitution.
Indeed, the Basic Law was "finalised withoutit being neither nationally debated and sans representationof the national political spectrum." (29). Thus, "politicalelements of the Panchayat order, who subsequentlyrefashioned themselves into the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party(RPP) and the Nepal Sadhbhavana Party (NSP), for example,were not represented" (30) in theconstitution-drafting/debating process.
Ideologicalfactors seem to have had more than a casual bearing on thebirth and evolution of the Maoist insurgency, not leastsince its conception and rise, more or less, coincided withthe collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the end ofthe Cold War. It also followed in the wake of the"revisionist" or capitalist trends set in motion not merelyin the land of Lenin but also that of Mao.
In the case ofChina, the earlier eclipse of the Gang of Four must havebeen particularly galling, not least since its GreatProletarian Cultural Revolution has provided muchinspiration, as has been admitted by Prachanda in aninterview to the Revolutionary Worker in 2002, thus:
Whenthe Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was initiated inChina under the leadership of great comrade Mao, it directlyimpacted on the revolution in Nepal.
There were manymaterials from the Chinese Cultural Revolution that came toNepal.
This Cultural Revolution inspired mainly theyounger generation of communists and the masses.(31)
There is a consensus that China's Great ProletarianCultural Revolution had a direct and profound impact on anarmed peasant uprising in the late 1960s by an extremistfaction of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). It cameto be known as the 'Naxalite movement' after the Naxalbaridistrict of the state of West Bengal in India, borderingeastern Nepal, where it first erupted.
As theorised,perhaps there is a nexus between the rise of the Maoistinsurgency and the post-1990 attributes such as freedom ofpolitical organisation and the freedom of expression thathelped in speeding the creation of a politically assertivecitizenry. It probably also provided additional space forarticulating
new political demands and in generallyencouraging political resistance, including that representedin extreme form by the Maoists.
Themilitary/security-related ties between Nepal and India havebeen cited as an important contributory factor. Possibly,that is because, it is included in the 40-point charter ofMaoist demands that, inter alia, includes the scrapping ofthe Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950,regulation of the open Nepal-India border and the closure ofGorkha (also Gurkha) recruitment centres inNepal.
Paradoxically, it is the open Nepal-India borderthat has had such a seminal impact on the Maoist revolt,including in arms/weapons supplies and to the to-and-fromovement of Maoist leaders/guerrillas, including formeetings, sanctuary and medication purposes in India.
Inconcluding this section, it would be remiss not to mention afinal cluster of proximate causes for the birth andescalation of the Maoist insurgency. They include:corruption, specifically by those in high places; thepoliticisation of the bureaucracy, the police force, thestate's intelligence services; and the conscious decision bysuccessive governments, 1990-2002, not to bolster thelegitimate counter-insurgency needs of the RNA.
SECTIONTWO: POST-FEB. 1, 2005 AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
Coming tothe heart of this essay, let us begin by taking note of someof the key policy declarations and utterances made by Maoistleaders in the period following King Gyanendra's assumptionof direct political rule on February 1, 2005. But, beforeactually doing so, it will be appropriate to take duecognizance of the raison d'etre and backdrop of the King'sdecision to rule directly for a temporary period.
RoyalProclamation, February 1, 2005
The King, inter alia,provided the following background to and rationale for hisdrastic action:
Even when bloodshed, violence anddevastation has pushed the country on the brink ofdevastation, those engaged in politics in the name ofdemocracy and people continue to shut their eyes to theirwelfare. Tussle for power, abuse of authority on gainingpower and unhealthy competition in fulfilling personal andcommunal interests at the expense of the nation and citizenscontributed to the deterioration of the situation (32)
Hethen went on to emphasise:
We have no interest other thanthe restoration of sustainable peace and exercise inmeaningful democracy for the welfare of Nepal andtheNepalese people. It is clear that what the people wantare a meaningful exercise in democracy, an effective marketeconomy, good governance, transparency and a corruption-freerule of law
He also proceeded to recall:
Contrary tothe wishes of the people on whom sovereignty is vested, noserious efforts were made towards initiating elections tothe House of Representatives within the year 2061 BS [2002]by maintaining, to the extent possible, peace andsecurity (34)
He proceeded to disclose:
The Council ofMinisters to be constituted will be under ourChairmanship.
This Council of Ministers will give utmostpriority to reactivating multi-party democracy in thecountry within three years with the implementation ofeffective reforms by restoring peace and security (35)
Ina clear reference to the Maoist insurgency, hedeclared:
No one will be allowed to jeopardize thepeople's security and the future of democracy. Nepal willnot allow terrorists to use her territory against herself oragainst any other friendly nation Effective measures will beadopted to curb corruption while ensuring that theprinciples of justice are not infringed upon.(36)
Prachanda: now a decisive phase
Prachanda himselfhas indicated that the Maoist movement may have entered adecisive phase, not long after the King's move of February1, 2005. In response to a written query about where hisrevolution stood, the Maoist supremo thundered:
The greatpeople's war has entered its last stage, of strategicoffensive.
In 1996, we had not a single modern weapon norany trained armed groups, only an ideological, political andmilitary line and a plan [that] defined three stages:defensive, equilibrium, and offensive. We have alreadypushed the R.N.A. [Royal Nepalese Army] into a defensiveposition and confined them to the capital, districtheadquarters and their barracks. We have confidence inultimate victory. (37)
His following response to aquestion about whether he believed his revolution wouldspread across the world is equally revealing:
Theimperialist world order makes a handful of rich richer andthe vast majority inhumanly poorer. Anybody can observe agrowing global unrest and protest by the masses against thisworld order. We deeply believe that what we are starting inNepal is only a part of a worldwide revolution. Our Party isnot only fighting autocratic monarchy but also the evil ofthe imperialist world. (38)
Yet, for all that bravado andbluster, the Maoist movement went into a period of crisisnot long after King Gyanendra's took control and made thecounter-insurgency campaign his number one priority, both atthe domestic level and in articulating his government'sposition at international fora. One area where this was mostvividly demonstrated was in the rupture between Prachandaand Bhattarai at which time it was openly speculated thatthe Maoist movement was doomed.
Schism & Patch Up:Prachanda/Bhattarai
First credible reports that partyideologue Bhattarai and supremo Prachanda had developedserious differences began to circulate in mid-March 2005when the RNA's Public Relations Directorate claimed thatpolitburo member Baburam Bhattarai, and his wife HisilaYami, had been expelled from the party. (39)
Days later, anews report in an official newspaper quoted a Home Ministrypress release to the effect that both Bhattarai and Yamihave been "prohibited to issue any statements regardingpeace" by "keeping them under a [sic] tight security of thearmed terrorists." (40) It informed that posters, pamphletsand wall paintings had appeared in Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan andDang districts with slogans such as 'Down with bloodthirstyPrachanda'; 'Hold peace talks soon"; "Do not play on [sic]with the blood of the sons and daughters of the people."(41)
A front-page news item days later not merelyproclaimed that the Maoists had confirmed Bhattarai'sexpulsion but added "he had been relieved from theresponsibilities of the terrorist group following his clashwith Prachanda." (42) Continuing to inform the generalpublic on the goings-on within the Maoist camp, the RNAdeclared that Bhattarai had been stripped of all leadershipresponsibilities and was henceforth just an ordinary partymember. (43)
Another twist was provided when RNA H/Q inKathmandu called a press conference and produced a videoclip that showed Prachanda attempting to justify the feudwithin the CPN (M), asserting that the world already knewthat Bhattarai had been reprimanded. (44)
A bombshell wasdetonated in the latter half of May 2005. News reportsdisclosed not only the presence of Bhattarai in New Delhibut also covered details of his meeting with Prakash Karat,general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist),allegedly aided by India's intelligence agencies, quoting areport in the Times of India, headlined "Indian spooks hostNepal rebel." (45)
The next day, Bhattarai and Karat"refuted news reports that they had met each other in theIndian capital last week." (46). Nevertheless, the followingday Prachanda disclosed that Bhattarai and Krishna BahadurMahara had been "specially assigned" to hold meetings withthe Indian government and political parties so as to createan atmosphere conducive for the "pro-democracy movement inNepal." (47)
Clearly, although there is no doubt that aserious schism had developed between Prachanda and Bhattaraiin mid-March, two months later, they decided to bury theirhatchet, ostensibly as a result of Indian intervention,possibly at the official and fraternal levels.
That thePrachanda/Bhattarai feud was a thing of the past by mid-Julywas underlined, notably, in an email statement by Prachandain which it was disclosed that Bhattarai and two othererstwhile members of the standing committee of the party'spolitburo had been reinstated. The two others to were Yamiand Dinanath Sharma, aka Ashok. As indicated, "they havebeen given the politburo's responsibility so that all theforces can be concentrated against [the] autocratic monarchyand the party can move ahead with new vigour." (48)
Notsurprisingly, suspicions about an India-Maoist nexus weremanifested in the outpourings of the non-Leftist Nepalimedia/commentators. One such concluded unambiguously thatBhattarai had been "reinstated after Indian intervention."(49)
The analysis noted that Bhattarai's reinstatementcame after the Maoists invited seven opposition parties toappoint a nominee to discuss an opposition alliance againstthe King, in response to NC president Girija PrasadKoirala's public declaration that he was ready to holddiscussions with the Maoists. (50)
The analyst recalled:"Before his suspension, Bhattarai charged Prachanda formonopolizing party and military power and developing apersonality cult to lead a pro-King faction in theorganisation." (51)
That analysis caused Bhattarai to"debunk pro-India charges through clarifications,accompanied with veiled threats" against the concernedweekly, in a letter. (52) He denied charges, via anotherletter, "by Leftist leader Sakti Lamsal in the newspaper [Nepal vernacular daily] pinning responsibility on Bhattaraifor the arrest by Indian police of Maoist leaders, MohanBaidya, CP Gajurel, Matrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar inPatna " (53)
It was not only within Nepal that the newpro-Indian posture of the Maoists began to be noticed, asindicated in a write-up by a Nepali journalist in the U. S.Therein, he recalled the falling-out between Prachanda andBhattarai pointing out that Bhattarai had "questioned thepropriety of Prachanda's photo being put together with Marx,Engles, Lenin, Stalin and Mao." (54)
He recalledPrachanda's response stating that Bhattarai's arguments hadproved that "he is not concerned about the party and therevolution, all he cares about is his personal position."(55) Also, he stated that "in a tape recording recovered bythe army, Prachanda was heard implying that Dr. Bhattaraiwas an 'Indian agent.' " (56) Responding, Bhattarai calledPrachanda a "palace lackey." (57)
Cease-fire and Prachandain Delhi
While the aftershocks of Bhattarai's presence inNew Delhi, soon after his rift with Prachanda, had not dieddown, there came another tremor. This was in the form ofPrachanda's startling alleged presence in the Indiancapital. That was disclosed by the Bharatiya Janata Party'smouthpiece The Pioneer in early September soon after theunilateral Maoist truce announced on 3 September 2005.
Itwas initially refuted by Indian government spokesmen butlater was admitted by Prachanda himself.
The Pioneerdisclosure was widely commented upon, especially that theMaoist's three-month cease-fire announcement on 3 Septembercame in the wake of Prachanda's being received by highofficials in the Indian Prime Minister's Office (PMO), a fewdays earlier.
It was meaningful that "the said news storyhas it that the meeting with Prachanda, at the PMO's officeno less, was opposed by India's Home Ministry but dissed notonly by South Block [Indian foreign office] czars but alsoby the PMO." (58)
Not surprisingly, Prachanda's dash toDelhi was taken note of widely, including by Nepaliexpatriates closely following events back home. One suchindividual had it that the circumstances surrounding thecease-fire announcement had thrown up a set of ominousquestions. "Prachanda ordered the truce two days aftersigning a statement with [Muppala Lakshman Rao] Ganapathy,the general secretary of the Communist Party of India(Maoist), reiterating their 'pledge to fight unitedly tillthe entire conspiracies hatched by the imperialists andreactionaries are crushed and the people's cause ofsocialism and communism are established in Nepal, India andall over the world.' " (59)
Significantly, in the 3September statement announcing the three-month cease-fire,the CPN (M) made reference to a series of internationalplayers who had been prescribing solutions to the crisis inNepal, including "the main neighbour," (60) an obviousreference to India.
It may be mentioned that while thestatement praised recent anti-monarchical moves by the NCand the UML as a basis for fortifying a common unity ofpurpose, it rejected their proposal for reinstatement of thedissolved House of Representatives. "That would only giveleeway to the palace to conspire. This leaves going for aninterim regime and constituent assembly as the only wayout." (61)
Four days after the cease-fire statement,Prachanda announced that his party would utilize thethree-month period "with mass mobilization and struggle" tocampaign for a democratic republic. (62) The statement,inter alia, informed that all party units would be mobilizedcollectively while the People's Liberation Army of Nepal[Maoist militia] would be kept on high alert in a state of"active defense" to foil possible attacks from the statesecurity forces. (63)
Prachanda, less than a week later,engaged in a further publicity blitz, granting aface-to-face interview at an undisclosed location to a Timesof India correspondent traversing "villages that can't benamed and through trails that can't be remembered."(64)
Therein, Prachanda downplayed his party's Indianconnections/plans, asserting that "revolution is not acommodity for export." (65) In his words, "We have onlyideological ties with Indian Maoists. We have no plans tolead joint armed struggle against India. We do not considerpeople's war as a commodity of export and import." (66)
Healso debunked the veracity of a mass of reports in Nepal andelsewhere affirming that "the talk of our forming a compactrevolutionary zone across the two countries is a creation ofthe media of the Indian government." (67) Prachandasuggested that " India should not help the King's army. Itshould extend moral and political support to the democraticstir in Nepal. We want fresh treaties between Nepal andIndia on natural resources and other important issues on thebasis of equality." (68)
Addressing the internationalcommunity, Prachanda declared: "We want the involvement ofthe United Nations to create an atmosphere so thatpossession of weapons by us does not become a stumblingblock in the peace process. As proof we have alreadydeclared a unilateral ceasefire now." (69) The Maoistsupremo had bitter words for the U.S. proclaiming: "In away, we're now fighting against international imperialism,especially US imperialism American commanders and generalsare arming and training the Royal Army. India has also lentit big support." (70)
At that time neither Americancommanders nor generals were arming or training the RNA, norwas India. Such activities had been suspended by bothpost-February 1, 2005.
Other views
One may now takecognizance of a sampling of media reports at variance withPrachanda's assertions. A write-up in the South Asia Tribuneonline newspaper, based on a purported interview with aNepalese Maoist activist in New Delhi, is noteworthy. Notonly does he assert that Tamil Tigers are "providingmilitary training to the Maoist rebels of Nepal in Biharnear the Nepalese border" (71) but that "all Maoist rebelsand parties have agreed to an international proposal todevelop a Red Zone (RZ) from Nepal to Sri Lanka."(72).
Such an agreement reportedly came not long after themerger on 15 October 2004 of the People's War Group (PWG)and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of India forming a newoutfit, namely the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M),whose general secretary is Muppala Lakshman Rao, aliasGanapathi Rao, (73) with whom Prachanda entered into anagreement in New Delhi two-days before his cease-fireannouncement of 3 September 2005.
The unidentifiedNepalese Maoist also disclosed to the South Asia Tribune:"The decision to assist the Maoist rebels of Nepal was takenat a secret meeting of the Maoist activists of eightcountries held in Kolkata in India." (74) Also disclosed wasthat "the Maoists of Peru, Netherlands, Norway, France,Germany, Sri Lanka, Nepal and India participated in themeeting. The Tamil Tigers and rebels of the UnitedLiberation Front of Assam (ULFA) were present as specialinvitees." (75)
The same report disclosed that theaforementioned meeting was held in 2004 "under the auspicesof the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties andOrganizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA)." (76)
Let us nowreturn to the unilateral three-month Maoist cease-fire of 3September 2005, extended for another month on 2 December2005, before being terminated on 2 January 2006 by Prachandawho squarely blamed the RNA. As he put it: "The RoyalNepalese Army has compelled us to end the ceasefire. It wasnot only impossible, but also suicidal for us to extend it."(77)
The announcement of an end of the Maoist cease-firecame as a blow for the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) many ofwhose leaders had days earlier expressed optimism that itwould be extended again. Indeed, early on 2 January, beforethe Prachanda's announcement, it was widely speculated thatit would be extended by another "10-15 days," when"extensive pressure would be mounted on the King, includingby Western countries." (78)
In the event, SPA leaders heldan emergency meeting shortly thereafter in Kathmandu. In astatement issued at its conclusion they declared: "We urgeMaoists to avoid violent activities against unarmed innocentpeople, respecting the people's desire for democracy andhuman rights." (79)
UML general secretary Madhav KumarNepal asserted: "The ceasefire has collapsed despite ourefforts, but we urge the Maoists to respect humanitarianrights and laws of war [The] State must take responsibilityas its refusal to respond to the ceasefire positively hasresulted in recurrence of violence." (80) In their jointstatement, the SPA called upon the rebels to remaincommitted to their 12-point understanding with the Maoists.(81)
The following day he asserted that the SPA are allset for a "final fight" to establish republican democracy inNepal (82), reflecting Prachanda's "decisive phase" languageof the Time magazine interview.
Despite the SPA's appeals,seven bomb explosions at public places in Bhairahawa,Pokhara and Butwal attributed to the Maoists were reported,sans casualties, hours after the announcement of the end ofthe cease-fire. (83)
While SPA representatives and theirsupporters had been pleading/hoping, weeks earlier, that thecease-fire would be extended, not all observers were equallyoptimistic. One analyst had predicted that the Maoists were"unlikely to extend" it, stating "Baburam Bhattarai gave thestrongest hint the cessation of hostilities won't beextended for the second time when he said, 'revolutionariesdon't make the mistake of indefinitely extending thecease-fire to help the Army.' " (84)
He argued that"another indication came when Maoists broke their owncease-fire and killed at least one soldier when theyattacked a security patrol Monday [26 December 2005]." (85)Likewise, he pointed out that "Maoists have now concentratedtheir activities, which promise to be violent, around urbancentres clearly aimed at disrupting the 8 February municipalpolls." (86)
Other immediate reactions
Internationalreactions were not slow in coming. The first one of notecame from India, just hours after it was announced. It wastermed as "an unfortunate decision" with a foreign ministryspokesman in New Delhi declaring: "We have consistentlycalled upon the Maoists to abandon violence, accept thediscipline of multi-party democracy, and work for apolitical settlement that contributes to the politicalstability and economic prosperity of Nepal." (87)
Theother substantive comment came from the U.S. StateDepartment spokesman Sean McCormack in Washington, dated 3January 2006. The full text is as below:
The United Statesis deeply concerned by the Maoists' announcement January 2ending their unilateral ceasefire. We condemn the Maoistbombings of office buildings outside Kathmandu. The UnitedStates has consistently called upon the Maoists to abandonviolence and rejoin the political mainstream. The end of theceasefire at this time is unhelpful and contrary to thatgoal. There can be no excuse for resumption ofviolence.
We urge the government to urgently reach out tothe political parties and find a way back to democracy inorder to restore peace to Nepal. A multi-party democracywith full respect for civil liberties and human rights isnecessary to bring lasting peace to Nepal. (88)
Paul KBute, spokesman of the British Embassy, was quoted asstating: "The United Kingdom is extremely disappointed thatthe unilateral ceasefire announced by the Maoists has beenterminated We call of all sides (the Palace, politicalparties and the Maoists) to work together for a permanentend to violence and towards an inclusive politicalsolution." (89)
The Embassy of Finland, which now holdsthe presidency of the EU in Nepal, (where there is noresidential Austrian Embassy) regretted the termination ofthe cease-fire in a statement attributed to Pauli Mustonen,Charge d'Affaires, thus: "We regret that the unilateralceasefire has been terminated." (90)
Likewise, a pressstatement issued by the UN System in Kathmandu expressedconcern that "the people of Nepal are again faced with theprospect of an escalation of fighting, the loss of morelives and increased suffering." (91)
To be specially notedis that India and the U.S. were categorical in theirinsistence that the Maoists abjure violence and that theydid not blame the government for the cease-fire'stermination.
Significantly, China -- Nepal's immediatenorthern neighbour from whose historic figure Mao Zedong theMaoists name themselves -- did not express any opinion.Neither, for that matter, did Pakistan, Bangladesh, SriLanka or Russia. All have residential embassies in Kathmanduand follow events closely.
No less meaningful was HomeMinister Kamal Thapa's dismissive comments on thetermination of the Maoist truce. He was quoted by theofficial English daily as declaring: "The so-calledcease-fire announced by the Maoists was not intended towardsestablishing peace" but rather "just a drama" dictated underpressure from the parties, civic society and theinternational community. (92)
On the day that the Maoisttruce ended, King Gyanendra was touring the eastern hilldistrict of Taplejung which has been affected by Maoistviolence where he reportedly told locals: "Peace will returnin the country, rest assured." (93).
12-Point SPA-MaoistPact of 22 November 2005
A reference was made earlier tothe 12-point SPA-Maoist Pact forged in New Delhi. It is timeto focus greater attention. On 22 November 2005 the 12-pointaccord was made public in separate statements signed by SPAleaders and Prachanda "following weeks of hectic meetings"(94) between their leading lights earlier in NewDelhi.
"The key point in the agreement is both theseven-party alliance and the Maoists are committed to go foran election to a constituent assembly, which, they insist,is the only solution to the crisis facing the country. Theyhave agreed to abide by the outcome of an election to aconstituent assembly. They have expected 'dependable'involvement of the international community during the talkprocess." (95)
While the two sides adhered to theirrespective "road maps" -- the SPA for a revival of thedefunct House of Representatives and the Maoists to theirformula of a national conference of democratic forcesleading to an interim government that will conduct electionsfor a constituent assembly -- NC president Koiralaproclaimed: "What we have entered into is an understanding,not a working alliance. It will pave the way for both theparties to move ahead." (96)
UML strongman Nepal describedit as a "breakthrough" and insisted that the Maoists hadpledged to join the mainstream. (97) He insisted: "The Kingmust now withdraw all regressive steps undertaken in thepast. Election to [a] constituent assembly is the only wayout." (98)
Amongst the most controversial provisions ofthe SPA-Maoist Pact is one requiring the army and the rebelsto be under the supervision of the UN or some suchinternational organisation until election for theconstituent assembly is over. (99)
The reactions of otherNepalese stakeholders to the SPA-Maoist Pact were ratherdifferent including, surprisingly, those from elementswithin the SPA itself. Sharply divergent interpretationswere also reflected in purportedly serious commentary fromoutside Nepal.
It immediately caused a rash of doubts tobe raised within Nepal. In a commentary, this paperpresenter argued that "the most prominent -- andobjectionable -- feature of the SPA-Maoist pact is that itwas engineered in Indian soil, acknowledged in a meaculpa in a BBC Nepali service interview by the Maoistsupremo himself." (100)
He had also indicated thatsuspicions had begun to surface from within the constituentsof the SPA itself pointing out that the "president of theNepal Workers' and Peasants' Party, Narayanman Bijukcche,has publicly stated he was kept in the dark about the12-point pact!" (101)
It was equally noteworthy that"similar public observations by Nawaraj Subedi, generalsecretary, Janamorcha Nepal" who "announced at a publicforum in Kathmandu that the seven parties' leaders had notbeen given the mandate to sign any pact, merely permissionto initiate talks." (102)
It was recalled that "Subedilambasted the proviso that during the period leading toelections for a constituent assembly some internationalorganisation, such as the UN, would be entrusted tosupervise weapons that the Royal Nepalese Army and theMaoists hold respectively." (103)
Attention was drawn tothe fact that "C.P. Mainali, leader of a SPA constituent,called for more clarification and, specifically, pointed outthe need to be careful to maintain Nepal's geopoliticalbalance." Similarly, this analyst directed attention to NC'sJoint General Secretary Ramsaran Mahat's
disclosure at afunction in Nuwakot: " Maoists are still hinderingactivities of political and social organisations. "(104)
Another outstanding feature of the post-Pact debatewas the overwhelming impression that the UML had "the keyrole in the tailoring of the 12-pointarrangement specifically that of its bossman Madhav KumarNepal." (105)
Other analysts, too, were highly critical.One asked why it was that "Nepali politicians, after allthese years, are now suddenly hobnobbing with theirarchenemy, the Maoists, who ousted them from power byexposing them to be inept and incompetent?" (106)
Hewondered why India is "so desperate to join hands with theMaoists, an outfit they once not only branded as terroristsbut even supplied lethal weapons to the Nepalese governmentto crush the rebellion they perpetrated." (107) Further, hemaintained: "Surely, India is aware that the politicalstalemate in Nepal was brought out by the musical chairs ofthe bickering power hungry leaders of political parties andthe Maoist insurgents and that it compelled the February 1move by the King." (108)
Another pointed out that evenNarayanman Bijukchhe of the Nepal Workers' and Peasants'Party had publicly stated: "The pressure by foreigners and adecision made in haste can give the country an outlet, butwe should remain alert to the danger it can pose to thecountry's independence and sovereignty." (109)
He recalledthat the then government spokesman and CommunicationsMinister Tanka Dhakal had rejected the concept of aconstituent assembly on which the Seven Party Alliance andthe Maoists had reached an agreement. (110)
Bijukcche, onanother public occasion, characterised the SPA-Maoist Pactas flawed saying that "as the supremacy and sovereignty ofthe state rests on military power, international supervision[of the RNA] is a serious issue." (111) Another prominentLeft politician, Chitra Bhadur KC, Speaker of the NepalCommunist Party (Unity Centre) stated that the Pact "hadgiven way to increased foreign intervention in the country,"(112) as also that "we need to look for the solution to theproblems from within the home country and the Maoists mustput an end to violence and killings." (113)
Twoconflicting Western assessments of 12-Point SPA-MaoistPact
Sharply divergent views on the 12-Point Pactgenerated within Nepal have been reflected amongst Westernscholars, too. Two conflicting viewpoints are nowpresented.
An upbeat, almost euphoric, assessment has beenmade by the International Crisis Group (ICG) long known forits transparent anti-Monarchy bias. Its latest report tocome to notice is an executive summary on the Pact, the fulltext of which has been published in a Kathmandu daily.(114)
It states plainly enough that the concerned parties"have reached agreement on a basic alliance against themonarchy." (115) It acknowledges the dialogue preceding thefinalisation of the agreement "had India's tacit backing andthat the deal was finalized at meeting in New Delhi." (116)It maintains that "many issues present challenges which haveonly been deferred and it is not clear if the new alliancewill hold out an olive branch to the king or try to forcehim into submission." (117)
It concludes, "both haverealized that their own strength is not enough to bedecisive." (118) It makes out that "the Maoists are preparedand have a clear strategy while the parties are stillworking out joint positions." (119) It argues that "theIndians have played their cards close to their chest andleft even close allies guessing about their intentions."(120) It makes the rather obvious point that the deal "isonly a bilateral process; other crucial players -- notablythe palace -- are excluded." (121)
Furthermore, it arguesthat "the parties are neither fully united nor well preparedand may concede too much too easily as bargainingprogresses, while the Maoists retain their arms and couldrevert to a military approach at any time." (122) The ICG'spro-Maoist sympathies come across in assertions such as:"Nevertheless, the alliance presents new opportunities: theMaoists are acting under genuine imperatives and constraintsand they are willing to offer significant concessions."(123). It goes on to say that a new dynamic has been createdas the "Maoists have forged a basic plan for joint actionagainst the monarchy." (124)
Eloquently missing in the ICGexecutive summary are any mention of the Maoists' contactsand alliances in India and beyond the seven seas, forexample, with the International Revolutionary Movement(RIM). There is also a conspicuous absence of any referencesto how other international players, besides India, arelikely to react, including China the target of the Maoists'rhetorical wrath. Nor has there been any attempt to probeIndia's intentions in lending "tacit backing" to acoordinated armed effort to uproot Nepal's monarchy by forceof arms.
The other Western assessment that I wish to turnto now is that by Dr. Thomas A. Marks an American politicalrisk consultant. He is clear that with the issuing of the12-Point "letter of understanding" between the Maoists andthe agitating seven-party alliance, "the conflict in Nepalhas entered a dangerous period." (125)
He challenges theview put forward by UML's Nepal that "the Maoists have'developed a new maturity' in concluding that they areunable to complete their 'capture of state power through thebarrel of a gun'." (126)
Consequently, he argues, they arewilling to do this peacefully, which means, "if the Maoistsresort to arms again, those in power will have to take theblame." (127) He asserts that this "would hardly seem astable platform for bargaining with the Palace, particularlygiven Madhab's astonishing rider: 'If the well-equipped Shahof Iran was uprooted by unarmed people, there is no reasonwhy it can't happen in Nepal.' "
(128)
Marks questionssarcastically: "Why the monarch would be even slightlyinterested in holding discussion based on such terms,apparently, is because the most important thing is 'peace'."(129) He points out: "Waving this flag, the politicalparties have, indeed, stormed back onto centre stage, makinga bargain which is altruistic, Machiavellian, or simplysuicidal, depending on how the cards fall." (130)
Heasserts that "there are too many unknowns, not least thenature of the Maoists' links with the newly formed CommunistParty of India-Maoist, CPI-Maoist, created through a mergingof the two principal Maoist insurgencies in India, andaggressively committed to violence as the only route topolitical power and social justice. (131)
Stating that theterms of reference of the Pact are "vague and contingentupon the surrender of the present Nepali Royal Government"(132), Marks argues that "this only heightens Nepalinationalist suspicions that what is being set in motion is a' Sikkim solution'." (133)
Enigma: Maoist-India ties
Thenature of the relationship between the Nepalese Maoists andIndia, both at the official and informal level, as also thatof Maoist/Naxalite groupings in India, has been a matter ofconsiderable concern, speculation, debate and puzzlement forlong.
Indeed, the Maoists' alleged Indian nexus has beenmost controversial, despite the fact that in their originalcharter of demands a good portion was related to opposingIndian hegemony. "Although India declared Maoists guerrillas'terrorists' long before the Deuba administration did inNovember 2001, it was common knowledge in Nepal that BaburamBhattarai and other top leaders were being provided safehaven in India while Maoist cadres who were injured werebeing given sanctuary and, often, medical care."(134)
Despite the assertions by Prachanda in his Times ofIndia interview, there is little doubt that there have been,and continue to be, extensive contacts and linkages betweenhis party and like-minded groupings in India. Most recently,it has been dramatised in the agreement between him andGanapathy on 1 September 2005 in New Delhi. Recent events,especially the cobbling of the 12-Point Pact in India havemade it more explicit.
Yet, much earlier too, "HouseSpeaker Taranath Ranabhat of the Nepali Congress surprisedquite a few by publicly linking the scourge of terrorism tothe open Nepal-India border." (135)
Indian Ambassador toNepal Shyam Saran, now Foreign Secretary, has gone on recordat a public function in Kathmandu admitting linkages betweenthe Maoists and their Indian counterparts. In recent years,India "extradited 42 Maoist cadres, including BamdevChhetri, who worked as a librarian at the Jawarharlal NehruUniversity in New Delhi." (136)
Then, "towards the end ofAugust 2003 it arrested senior Maoist leader C.P. Gajurel inChennai, as he was boarding a flight to Frankfurt en routeto London on a fake British passport. (137) It has also"banned the pro-Maoist Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj."(138) Thereafter, "India tightened patrolling of theNepal-India border, banned pressure cooker exports to Nepaland, significantly, in March this year [2004] arrested MohanVaidya, aka Kiran in Siliguri", (139) a township in Indianear Nepal's eastern border.
" New Delhi also came downhard on the attack on Indian nationals and cargo by Maoists,reportedly angered over Vaidya's arrest. Not too long ago[after that] India handed over to Nepal senior leadersMatrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar." (140)
Yet, despitesuch putative anti-Maoist action by New Delhi, many inKathmandu, including UML figures such as former minister ModNath Prasit, have charged that India makes a distinctionbetween "the big and little Maoists" sheltered in India.(141) It is extremely doubtful whether he, or anyone in theUML leadership hierarchy, would venture to repeat thatcharge today.
No wonder, then, that many analysts in Nepalare "convinced that the Maoist movement is an Indiancreation aimed at Nepal's ultimate disintegration -- andtakeover." (142) Yet, "others summarily dismiss thathypothesis given -- initially -- the strong 'anti-Indian'thrust of the 40-point charter of demands with which theylaunched their movement in 1996." (143)
Of course, "thereis the possibility that the Indian establishment is itselfdivided on how it should deal with Nepal's Maoists with onegroup arguing for an accommodative stance and the other fora hard line approach. Besides, can one be absolutely certainthat there are no rogue elements within India's powerfulintelligence agencies determined to bring Nepal to herknees, once and for all?" (144)
Such division andvacillation are possibly extant vis-à-vis India's Nepalpolicy, a theme I will return to later in the concludingsegment. Before that, we may note what Mohan Bikram Singh,general secretary United Front (Masal), who has had such aseminal role in the evolution of the Maoist movement, has tosay on the subject.
Answering a query on the Maoists'relations with India he declared: " India always wantsinstability in Nepal. It wishes that Nepal should never beable to resolve the Maoist insurgency and it will becompelled to invite the Indian army to contain the violencehere. The Maoists, like other political parties in the past,have become the best weapon for India to fulfill itsmission." (145)
Interestingly, he described the Maoistmovement in these harsh terms: "The Maoists have gonefurther from their mission of introducing fundamentalchanges in Nepal. They are more influenced by Trotsky thanMao, Marx and Lenin. They are more opportunistic andcareer-minded Unlike Mao who never extorted, the Maoists inNepal continue extorting, and butchering people, which hasdistanced the rebels from society." (146)
Mention may nowbe made of an incident in January 2005 when a group of 14Indian Army soldiers belonging to a Gorkha regiment inDarchula near the Nepal-India border in the west wereabducted on their way home on furlough. Two days later theMaoists' Kailali district-in-charge Akhanda at awell-publicised function released them. Akhanda toldreporters that they had abducted the Indian army soldiers to"throw [a] challenge to the present Nepali government."(147)
The Indian Ambassador Shiv Shanker Mukherjee,however, was not amused, as he stated at a press conferencein Birgunj that "we have taken it seriously" (148) addingthat the "Maoist insurgency is rather terrorist [sic] thanpolitical" (149). That, statement, of course, sounds hollowand out of joint today, in the face of events later in 2005,especially the dramatic developments in May, September andNovember when Maoist leaders were feted in the very highestpolitical circles in New Delhi.
Another twist to theabduction tale was provided by another daily that reportedthat the Maoists claimed the reason for the abduction wasthat the Indian army soldiers had been mistaken for RNA men.(149) Not a few pointed out how quickly the Maoists releasedtheir captives once they discovered that they were IndianGorkhas, not RNA soldiers.
Maoist strategy and tactics
Afew paragraphs on Maoist strategy and tactics would behelpful to more fully appreciate what the prospects for thesuccess of the proclaimed "decisive phase" of their movementare. A Nepalese commentator has credibly outlined what Ibelieve are some of the insurgency's keycharacteristics.
In his opinion, "their immediateobjective/strategy is to seek national and internationallegitimacy and recognition as a political movement withtheir own established security wing." (150) He maintainsthat "in this regard they have to prove that there is astrategic stalemate, there are controlled areas and staticHQs in Nepal." (151).
He asserts: "They are struggling toconvince the UN system, the international community,NGO/INGO[s] and the Nepali public that there are twogovernments, two regimes and [that] there is a state withina state." (152) Their second objective is "to capture [a]couple of district HQs and strategic locations and force thegovernment to declare [an] unilateral cease-fire and presentunacceptable demands during the negotiations."(153)
Thirdly, "they want to exploit the internalintrigues and conflicts in the democratic political parties,particularly some of the unbridled leadership, by preachingpeople's new democracy/democratic republic etc., till theycapture the state authority and finally impose their ownideology." (154)
Incidentally, given the above referenceto an unilateral cease-fire by the state -- and notforgetting the unilateral four-month Maoist cease-fire thatwas terminated on 2 January 2006 -- this paper presenterwishes to focus attention to what Mao Zedong, the proponentof "people's war", had to say on that subject.
In chapter8 of his so-called "Little Red Book", dealing with "People'sWar", Mao has offered the following piece of advice: "Makegood use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, trainand consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training andconsolidation should not in general be very long, and theenemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathingspace." (155)
Changing dynamics/command and controlissue
A research associate at New Delhi's Institute forConflict Management two years ago wrote about the changingdynamics of the Maoist movement. He focused on Maoistincursions across the open Nepal-India border, and theextent to which they "have succeeded in establishing a base,or securing safe havens, in India." (156)
Apart from themeetings between the Maoists and other Left Nepali partiesin India, such as those in Lucknow in November 2003 and inSiliguri in August 2001, "there has also been reportage ofthe Maoist insurgents establishing linkages with a melangeof Indian left-wing groups and at least two insurgent groupsactive in India's northeast." (157)
He maintains that "theextremely porous 1,800 kilometre-long border offersuninterrupted passage for illegal smuggling of goods, arms,ammunition and narcotics " (158) besides a convenientpassage for injured Maoists from Nepal to be treated inhospitals in India. He quotes an Associated Press report of13 December 2003 to the effect that "at least 128 injuredMaoists" (159) had been treated in hospitals in the Indianstate of Uttar Pradesh, bordering Nepal.
He discloses that"there have been many instances that establish the fact thatthe Maoists have been procuring weapons and are conductingjoint training camps along the Bihar-Nepal border." (160).He asserts that "along the border areas in north Bihar theyhave formed an 'Indo-Nepal Regional Committee' (INBRC) toco-ordinate their activities." (161)
He concludes, "whileIndia has been primarily concentrating on securing itsborders with Pakistan and Bangladesh, its open border withNepal is now evidently threatened by continuing Maoisttransgressions." (162)
Clearly, at least two conclusionsfrom the above could seem to be inescapable. One is that theIndian State, that prides itself as a nuclear-weapons powerand a legitimate candidate for permanent membership of theUN Security Council, is either an extraordinary "softstate." Else, it has deliberately chosen to turn a blind eyeon the developments referred to by the Indian researcherquoted above for motives that must be suspect in patrioticNepalese eyes.
Coming, now, to the issue of command andcontrol within the ranks of the Maoist movement, referenceis made, if only briefly, to a revealing write-up in October2004 that has a direct bearing on the subject.
Asasserted, "recent Maoist atrocities in various districts,and statements from central level leaders claiming these areagainst party policy, has raised a serious doubt: Is theMaoist leadership steadily losing [its] grip over itsmilitias?" (163)
A local Maoist leader Diwaker was quotedas stating, "that the series of attacks launched against thecadres of [the] People's Front Nepal (PFN) [JanamorchaNepal] in recent weeks in Pachthar, Dang, Baglung, Myagdi,and Dailekh districts were against the policy of the Maoistcentral command." (164)
The statement also admitted thatsuch mistakes were committed as a result of "local internalconflicts" (165). Thus, "since such attacks have taken placein so many districts of different regions, it only raises aserious question about the extent of 'internal conflict'within the Maoist rank and file." (166)
At this juncture,this analyst wishes to recall a plethora ofwrite-ups/disclosures in the Nepali vernacular media that,from time to time, have come out withreports/speculation/rumours of splits between the militantand political wings of the Maoist movement, led respectivelyPrachanda and Baburam Bhattarai.
Periodic reports ofideological differences have come to light over what hasdeveloped as a Prachanda personality cult within themovement. Indeed, a recent disclosure was that "the Maoistsare wearing their supreme leader Prachanda's locket on theirchest. It makes it clear that Prachanda has started tocompare himself with the great leader of China, Mao Zedong."(167)
It was credibly established during thePrachanda-Baburam "split" referred to earlier, that armedgroups loyal to each were determined to fight the other.Given the shadowy nature of the movement and the danger forany outsider to attempt to establish what is really what, itis difficult (a) to pronounce categorical judgement in thatregard and (b) to assess the seriousness of such problems inthe command and control hierarchies of the Maoistinsurgency.
However, what cannot be dismissed asinconse
Source: scoop
All trademarks and copyrighted information contained herein are the property of their respective owners.
Related Telecom Articles
|
