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The Public Sphere in Conflict and Transition State20 March 2006
The Public Sphere in Conflict and TransitionStates By Am Johal
The public sphere as aconcept which has been under development since the days ofSocrates and Plato, continues to be the subject of moderndebate. Socrates, in the end, was executed not forasserting the way the world should be, but for doubting thetruths of others.[1] Non-conformism in the public sphere has thus historicallyoften been dangerous intellectual terrain virtually sincethe beginning of modern civilization.
As state andinstitutional failures continue to affect modernnation-states, international and regional standards andapproaches in responding to these areas are still in theearly stages of formation. The post-colonial and post-ColdWar world are still in the process of transition. Thepublic sphere as a formal and informal public space for thecontest of ideas still has severe limitations on itsdevelopment and in the case of conflict states, there isstill not a developed process regarding intervention whenthose systems are being compromised often leading todisastrous consequences to human life, national economies,regional destabilization and social disruption. What can bedone then to enhance and support a dynamic, fair and activepublic sphere which genuinely involves the citizenry?
Infact, many non-governmental organizations, foreign affairsdepartments and international bodies are focused on theseefforts. The twentieth century particularly has multipleexamples of nation-states which could not withhold theunderlying tensions which existed in their societies andwhich allowed a messianic ideology to play itself out in theform of genocide and war crimes. In many of these examples,media and other elements of the public sphere weremanipulated and distorted to meet the ends of elitepolitical formations.
Ross Howard of the Media andDemocracy Group has argued that "incompetent, partisan andmisinformed journalism has incited racist, hate-filledviolence around the world particularly in places such asRwanda, the Balkans and Cambodia."
He recently wrote: "Reliable reporting, and responsibly written editorials andopinion, do things such as establish communication amongdisputant parties, correct misperceptions and identifyunderlying interests. The media provides an emotionaloutlet. It can offer solutions, and build confidence." [2]
Hannah Arendt andJuergen Habermas have written extensively on the distortionof state systems by political apparatuses particularly intotalitarian states. It is particularly in this environmentwhere the need to control every aspect of state systemsviolates concepts which are considered basic principles ofmodern democratic systems in nation-states such as theseparation of powers. Though even in modern democraticstates there are regular distortions of democraticprocesses, the separation of power allows for the excessesto be analyzed in public view. For example, the LiberalParty in Canada lost the recent federal election largely asa result of public concerns with political influence overgovernment advertising contracts. Even those states whichdo not have a Western democratic model of governance,stability often times comes as a result of some variation ofthese basic themes even where a culture of democracy is notthe prevailing system of organization ofnation-states.
The emergence of state failure as a regularfeature of international relations in the post-colonial erahas led to interest in particular aspects of conflictprevention including humanitarian intervention in mediarelated spheres. The European Union, as a major player inthe region where many transition states exist without ahistory of democratic systems and processes, is still in theearly stages of developing guidelines, benchmarks andprecedents for intervention when appropriate. In fact, theEuropean Union is now regularly assessing democratic systemsin nation-states on objective criteria and publiclyreporting on them. Since the end of the Second World War,over 50 million people have died in various conflicts in theworld.[3]
In herbook "The Origins of Totalitarianism," Hannah Arendtdocuments the modern rise of anti-semitism from the 1880 sand how the totalitarian system of Nazism fifty years laterdistorted state apparatuses to build a dangerous and racistpublic sphere out of a virulent form of nationalism based onhistorical grievances. German romanticism and the role ofpersonality laid amongst the intellectuals of that time laidthe foundations for the collapse that followed. Thedistortion of transforming anti-semitism in to a politicalweapon required a weakness on the part of the apparatuses ofthe state to remain independent and of the citizenry to haveadequate structures in place in order to allow such acatastrophic failure to occur. Without a culture ofdeveloped civic involvement or a history of democraticparticipation, many of these nations were highly susceptibleto elitist formations distorting power. [4]
Race andbureaucracy as elements of imperialism were utilized at theend of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to oftenviolent conclusions including the "Boers extermination ofHottentot tribes, the murdering by Carl Peters in GermanSoutheast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful Congopopulation -- from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 millionpeople." [5]
All ofthese totalitarian movements required the elite, the mob andthe masses in order to overthrow the prevailing structures. In the example of totalitarian movements such as BolshevikRussia or Nazi Germany, Arendt wrote that, "Only the mob andthe elite can be attracted by the momentum oftotalitarianism itself; the masses have to be won bypropaganda. Under conditions of constitutional governmentand freedom of opinion, totalitarian movements strugglingfor power can use terror to a limited extent only and sharewith other parties the necessity of winning adherents and ofappearing plausible to a public which is not yet rigorouslyisolated from all other sources of information."[6] Or as E. Kohn Bramstedtstated in Dictatorship and Political Police: TheTechnique of Control by Fear in 1945 that "terrorwithout propaganda would lose most of its psychologicaleffect, whereas propaganda without terror does not containits full punch." In the case of Stalin, he simply rewrote anew history of the Russian Revolution after thepurges.
Totalitarian leadership in this era consistentlyshowed that isolating mass communities and controllinginformation and propaganda were some of the basic tools usedin practice. Safeguarding and maintaining this fictitiousworld was part of the apparatus of controlling the publicsphere for the purposes of value formation and realityconstruction. Without the separation of systems, thisdistorted and perverted the entire state apparatus with thevalues of the totalitarian movement. [7] The eliteformations, with what Hannah Arendt describes as the mob,were then in a position to utilize propaganda to mobilizethe masses after taking over the institutions of the state: "Without the organizational division of the movement intoelite formations, membership, and sympathizers, the lies ofthe Leader would not work." [8] Totalitarianmovements were distinguished from despotism, tyranny anddictatorship in that they required mass appeal.
Theinstitutions where secrecy was required was where the eliteformations carried out their actual planning. All publicdisplays such as political party events were merely displaysand simulacra for the actual process of public policyplanning. This required control of police and secretservices to maintain the culture of fear and dominationtowards any threat to the totalitarian movement. In theSoviet and Nazi regime, the masses were to be controlled,manipulated and brought in to line by any means necessary inorder to fit the model of totalitarian control. [9]
Without strongpolitical, cultural, social and historical conditions ofcivic engagement and the culture of a critical citizenrywith developed public structures as safeguards, the masseswere vulnerable to the misuses of history and persuasion tobe attracted to what by appearances was a populist movement.In many respects these movements were part of a historicaland cultural context, but could not have been deformed tothe extent they were without the leadership apparatusessurrounding the leading personalities of Hitler and Stalin. It would also be fair to say that those very institutionswere still in developmental stages themselves in comparisonto more developed democracies and that historical factorswhich saw decades of centralized government in Germany andRussia were particularly fertile grounds for organized massmovements to utilize new organizing and communicationmethods to mobilize the masses. This creation of almostmass hysteria exhibited especially in Nazi Germany could nothave been cultivated if the movement itself was not able todistort the historic grievances of the First World War andother illusory visions of grandeur in to a massmovement.
Arendt, in her concluding chapter to The Originsof Totalitarianism, identifies loneliness as the conditionsunder which totalitarianism can flourish. In her view, itis in this environment that seemingly normal people cansupport the mass organizing appeal of undemocratic movementsdue to their appeal to reason and distortion of dialectics.[10]
Canadianphilosopher John Ralston Saul has written that "To livewithin ideology, with utopian expectations, is to live in noplace, to live in limbo. To live nowhere. To live in avoid where the illusion of reality is usually created byhighly sophisticated rational constructs." [11]
He argues that inWestern history, there have been four primary sources oflegitimacy in wielding state power: God, king, groups orthe individual citizenry acting in unison. Historically,the first three have negated the role of the individualcitizen to a state of passivity. Even in the era of themedieval church, the concepts of faith, hope and charity asaspects of the human condition came from the negation of theindividual self and imposed passivity as the prevailingsocial order. Individualism, distinct from the first three,requires participation as a precept to acquiring legitimacy.Saul has argued that modern Western democracies todayfunction on the relationship between groups at the expenseof the individual citizen - a de facto state of corporatism.[12]
Even in thecontemporary post-modern context with the availability ofmultiple forms of media and the immediate speed ofcommunication for many parts of the world, the manipulationof symbols and images in controlled and isolatedenvironments can provide the same basis for contributing toinstitutional collapse and state failure if basic safeguardsare not in place. Referring to processes of deliberation,Habermas has written:
Deliberation refers to a certain attitude toward socialcooperation, namely, that openness to persuasion by reasonsreferring to the claims of others as well as one s own. Thedeliberative medium is a good faith exchange of views -- including participants reports of their own understandingof their respective vital interests - in which a vote, ifany vote is taken, represents a pooling of judgments. [13]
He has also argued that exercise offreedoms in an open society have to be regularly put toaction in order to adequately understand the prevailingnorms and conditions which govern a state, whether formallyor informally. In the context of the need for public andopen deliberation of establishing these frameworks in agiven society, Habermas also makes the distinction betweenrational and irrational public debate and the need forsocieties to define their barriers and limitations in anopen public sphere. [14]
In the latetwentieth century, there has been the added dynamic of amore developed concept of international laws and conventionswhich could be used as a framework of modern values whichcould be debated and deliberated upon and serve as afoundation of basic norms and values.
As John RalstonSaul explains in describing the underlying values of stateorganization:
It depends upon thecommitment of the citizen to the common good. This is thetrue meaning of obligation. Those who govern or have powercannot on the one hand invoke obligation and on the otherdeny the common good and the real legitimacy of thecitizen Equilibrium, in the Western experience, is dependentnot just on criticism, but on non-conformism in the publicplace. [15]
Deliberative democracy orcitizen-based democracy is built upon systems of real,meaningful participation as a bulwark against imposedideologies by political parties on state institutions. Certainly, disruptions or distortions of systems are one ofthe trip wires associated with monitoring legitimate uses ofpower by various institutional safeguards such as a civilservice, legal system, a functioning civil society or a freepress. A corporatist system contains features which allowfor permanence, stability and power constellations, but canactively contribute to passivity in the public sphere byindividual citizens due to limited access points for genuineparticipation. [16]
Saul identifies in much the same way as Habermas thatconcepts of free, open societies such as common sense,creativity, ethics, intuition, memory and reason can beeither utilized as filters for public action and used as abasis of evaluation of a public sphere or they can be"exploited individually as a justification for ideology." Even in the corporatist system, language has the tendency ofbeing cut off from reality. [17]
What is alsosignificant in the underlying current of historical examplesis the myth of progress or as the historian Sidney Pollardnoted in 1968 that "the assumption that a pattern of changeexists in the history of mankind that it consists ofirreversible changes in one direction only, and that thisdirection is towards improvement" or in the words of thewriter Ronald Wright, "Myth is an arrangement of the past,whether real or imagined, in patterns that reinforce aculture s deepest values and aspirations Myths are sofraught with meaning that we live and die by them. They arethe maps by which cultures navigate through time." [18]
However, certainmyths, through the distortion of ideologies, and deliveredthrough the apparatuses of mass propaganda withoutlegitimate checks and balances can provide a rich breedingground and potential for the conditions that can ultimatelylead to state failure.
This historical development ofthe belief in progress with nationalist aims has also workedto create dangerous linkages when taken out of context byelite formations and perverted by the need for mass appealof these movements. [19]
There are alsonumerous examples of the same principle working indemocratic states to a much lesser extent. Some could arguethat ideology and progress played a factor in thedevelopment of nuclear weapons as an advancement ofcivilization. There was also a rich debate when US StateDepartment official Frances Fukuyama called capitalism anddemocracy the "end of history," after the end of the ColdWar. [20]
States,whether democratic, totalitarian, despotic or other,according to Wright, "arrogate to themselves the power ofcoercive violence: the right to crack the whip, executeprisoners, send young men to the battlefield. From thisstems that venomous bloom which J.M. Coetzee has called, inhis extraordinary novel Waiting for the Barbarians,"the black flower of civilization" -- torture, wrongfulimprisonment, violence for display -- the forging of mightinto right." [21]
The systems of decision-making and their ability todistort process to meet political ends, and the extent towhich they will be taken are important factors ofconsideration in analyzing what safety mechanisms need to bein place so that a state of chaos and even elements ofinstitutional failure do not occur. [22] The Hutton Inquiryin Britain over the death of weapons inspector David Kellyor the US s own use of intelligence in the lead up toinvading Iraq are recent examples where public interestquestions regarding process distortion are relevant in ademocratic context whether they occur or not. It is acentral feature of the public sphere.
There are broaderquestions at play when discussing uses of history or evencontemporary information for political ends. In response tothe "interest theory" of memory construction, where the pastcan be manipulated to meet present needs, Michael Schudsonsuggests that the past is at least partially recorded andcan develop with some sense of objectivity to measureagainst. Others such as Barry Schwartz have written that"given the constraints of a recorded history, the pastcannot be literally constructed; it can only be selectivelyexploited." Collective memory also has many similarities tomyth in the sense that there is constant negotiation overtime and is a fluid construction to fit historicalcircumstances. Social movements which become a politicalforce bring together individual and collectiverepresentation. [23] Benedict Anderson has argued that "imagined" as well as"real" communities have been created by the mass media andin the 20th Century have been utilized numerous times fornationalist purposes in terms of memory construction. [24]
The failures ofWeimar German society in the 1930 s which led to the rise ofHitler could not happen today in Germany due to thedevelopment of structures both within the state, civilsociety and even at the regional and international level. German identity after the Second World War involved decadesof memory denial, reconstruction, and was debated at lengthwith the themes of individual and collective guilt. Ritualsof confession and guilt were built on various narratives ofcollective stigma until by the early 1970 s, admittance ofcollective guilt decoupled from individual complicity workedto heal ruptures in German society.
The kneeling ofSocial Democratic leader Willy Brandt in Poland whilevisiting the site of the ghetto uprising against Germanoccupation served as a gesture of recognition of Germancomplicity in war crimes, while providing a means of movingforward from a history that had plagued Germany for decades.As this was done in an international setting in aspontaneous way, it was a very public showing of theacceptance of responsibility. In this way, the publicsphere can also be a place of collective reconciliation intransition states or a place to enact justice or revengesuch as televising the execution of Nicolae Ceauºescu inRomania. [25]
TheMarxist historian Isaac Deutscher has suggested that theenormity of the moral and institutional collapse related tothe Holocaust may not even be understood with the passing oftime:
I doubt when even in a thousandyears people will understand Hitler, Auschwitz, Majdanek,and Treblinka better than we do now. Will they have abetter historical perspective? On the contrary, posteritymay even understand it all even less than we do.
Who cananalyze the motives and the interests behind the enormitiesof Auschwitz We are confronted here by a huge and ominousmystery of the generation of the human character that willforever baffle and terrify mankind. [26]
In Eastern and Central Europe thereare dozens of empty synagogues from that period with onlyminor acknowledgement of their historical significance. TheGerman Friedrich Reck-Malleczewen wrote in his diary beforehe was executed in 1944:
How much wereally know about the vaults and caverns which lie somewhereunder the structure of a great nation -- about these psychiccatacombs in which all our concealed desires, our fearfuldreams and evil spirits, our vices and our forgotten andunexpiated sins, have been buried for generations? Inhealthy times, these emerge as the specters in ourdreams But suppose, now, that all of these things generallykept buried in our subconscious were to push their way tothe surface, as in the blood-cleansing function of a boil?[27]
Major cultural traumas, superimposedby historical periods, always take on their own meanings andcan delegitimize previous societal norms even indemocratically robust and open societies. After September11th, most of the United States had forgotten about thecloseness of the 2000 election in Florida. After a periodof mourning, the mass calls for a response also created acultural atmosphere where an element of the mob responded. Muslim Americans and even a Sikh gas station attendant inthe United States were killed by vigilantes attempting toexact some kind of irrational mob revenge.
As Habermashas noted, at points of cultural trauma or heightened powerdynamics, the polarized views tend to dominate the publicsphere and moderate voices become sidelined. This is one ofthe early stages of social rupture and can deteriorate in toa state of anomie, or moral chaos. The Polish academicPiotr Sztompka as well as many others have noted that:
Change is a universal and pervasivefactor of social life. There is no society without change. Seemingly stable, unchanging phenomena are just congnitivelyfrozen phases in the constant flow of social events,snapshots of the world, which as such, never stops in itstracks. Ontologically, society is nothing else but change,movement and transformation, action and interaction,construction and reconstruction, constant becoming ratherthan stable being. [28]
This observation begs the basicquestion of how then do we manage change, trauma and socialrupture in nation-states? How can legitimate dynamism andnegotiation of ideas in the public sphere be adequatelygiven a space for contestation? What are the systems thatneed to be in place which ensure dynamism within theinstitutions of society which reflect the will of thepeople? Where do the boundaries become blurred? How isthere genuine involvement of the citizenry?
Sztompka hashighlighted the divisions between the sociological view ofprogress against the discourse of crisis. There are sixhistorical themes he emphasizes amongst the discourse ofcrisis: 1) Lost community raised byFerdinand Tönnies 2) Anomie, or moral chaos, raised byEmile Durkheim 3) Bureaucracy, or "extreme instrumental,manipulative rationality" developed by MaxWeber 4) Decaying mass culture and the dangers ofmassification by Ortega Y Gasset 5) Ecologicaldestruction, degradation of nature and "limits togrowth" 6) Industrialization of war, genocide, statefailure and the spread of terrorism and violence [29]
A third discourse of trauma hasrecently been developed which attempts to identify aspectsof social change that deliver "profound shocks and wounds tothe social and cultural tissue." [30] Four traits oftraumatogenic change include: 1) sudden and rapid change, or a lengthy process whichreaches 'point of saturation 2) wide and comprehensivein scope and affects many actors and many actions 3) that it is radical, deep, fundamental and pervasivein the sense that it affects social or personal life in auniversal way, whether public or private and can change theprevailing dominant values, prestige or hierarchy in theconstitution of society 4) that which is widelyunexpected by the masses [31]
The historian Tony Judt has writtenthat the twentieth century has been unparalleled in itsscientific, technological and social changes. In thecontext of this great upheaval, the public sphere inconflict states need to be viewed in this historic frame. The learning that has occurred under transition in variousparts of the world and the development of international andregional institutions as well as the various examples ofstate failures have given the international community somesense of the basic norms in stable societies: the rule oflaw, the free competition of public ideas, dynamism on thesocial and economic front, the competition amongst politicalparties and within political institutions, the separation ofpowers, a free press as some examples. [32]
The sources ofcultural trauma, as Sztompka points out, can be as varied asintensifying cultural contact, enhanced spatial mobility,the change of fundamental institutions and the incapacity ofa population to follow the cultural imperatives of the newsystem such as the example of transition states in EasternEurope, or a fundamental change of ideas at the level of"beliefs, creeds, doctrines, ideologies." Societalresponses to rapid change such as nostalgia for the past ora lack of faith in the institutions of the state areexamples. [33]
Inresponse to these broad themes of progress, crisis andtrauma, John Ralston Saul would argue that the "process ofseeking equilibrium is the essence of civilization." [34]
According toSaul, "For a start, life is something that goes by, and whenit s over there isn t any more. Time is therefore theessential human condition and fear of its passing theessential human emotion. Or worse still, fear of ourceasing to exist." [35]
Additionally, the role of reason in the development ofpublic ethics has also had numerous examples where it hasbeen deformed from ethical and humanist foundations. Totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russiaand other forms such as Apartheid-era South Africa allutilized a measure of reason and logic in bureaucratizingsystems of deep and inhumane oppression. [36]
The 1993-1994genocide in Rwanda took between 500,000-800,000 lives. Thehead of the UN peacekeeping force, Canadian Major-GeneralRomeo Dallaire, repeatedly asked for permission from UNheadquarter in New York to intervene. Eight months afterthe original request, he received 2,548 poorly trainedtroops. By the time the genocide began, the force was downto 450. [37]
Dallaire later had a breakdown and at one point was founddrunk in the morning on a Montreal park bench. He wouldlater publicly admit to two suicide attempts. As he laterwrote in his own words:
There weremore people killed , wounded, or made refugees in less thanfour months in Rwanda than in the long Yugoslav war. And wepoured tens of thousands of troops into Yugoslavia And so Icame to the conclusion that the world s response isfundamentally racist. I cannot, as many people urge, justput it behind me, get a new life. I can t wash my hands,like Pontius Pilate, of 800,000 dead. I can t forget thepeople with all the hope they had, and then watching them asdisplaced people, seeing them after they had been chopped up -- and when the survivors saw the blue beret, there was justbewilderment. What had happened? And seeing the terror,the horror in the eyes of children You don t, you don t justsay damn, I did what I could, and it s too bad. Not thisstuff. I don t think I m allowed to do that morally." [38]
Even in places with a history ofdemocracy, rule of law and stability, failures of the publicsphere to have legitimate and just barriers have led tonumerous instances of incitement to violence by the dominantnarratives which existed historically. In the UnitedStates, 4,742 blacks were lynched in the first sixty yearsof the 20th Century and there are even today numerousexamples of violent beatings of homosexuals in democraticand free societies. [39]
In places of deep,historical divisions such as South Africa, Chile orArgentina, there are numerous examples of the role of publicdisplays of reconciliation in order to create a communalstarting point. As Jose Zalaguett of the Chilean TruthCommission has stated it this way: "Identity is memory. Identities forged out of half-remembered things or falsememories easily commit transgressions." [40]
Descartes,centuries ago, made the argument that we must learn toforget in order to free the mind. The nineteenth centuryFrench thinker Ernest Renan made the point that freedomcould only be achieved by leaving behind parts of history. Certainly the 20th Century is littered with examples ofdistorted versions of history, past tragedies or wrongsbeing isolated from context and used as tools for racism,state-building and other imperial adventures. The moderntools of mass communication including propaganda and publicrelations certainly play a role in this regard. As manythinkers have highlighted including Habermas, Arendt andSaul, "reason used as an ideology has found memory aparticularly useful mechanism to either denigrate orexploit." [41]
The contemporary debate around global media ethics is ledby academic institutes and UN agencies such as UNESCO. TheUN recently held a "World Summit on the InformationSociety." The European Union is actively developingstandards for communication policies in member states. Dr.Stephen Ward on his new website on journalism ethics housedat the Sing Tao School of Journalism at the University ofBritish Columbia highlights two reasons for a need forglobal media ethics:
1) Practical: a non-global ethic isno longer able to adequately address the new problems ofjournalism, and
2) Ethical: new global responsibilitiescome with global impact and reach. [42]
Not only byreframing the ethics debate in journalism in this way,international and domestic institutions can createappropriate legislation to set up the legislative frameworkfor a free press in conflict and post-conflict states. Aswell, amateurs have utilized their positions to getinformation out in public ways which has raised ethicsconcerns related the organic development of a public spherewith legitimate barriers. Internet technology particularlyhas complicated the matter further.
Ward furtherhighlights how the practical implementation of globaljournalism ethics would be different if journalistswould:
1) Act as global agents Journalists should seethemselves as agents of a global public sphere. The goal oftheir work should be an informed, diverse and tolerantglobal "info sphere" that challenges the distortions oftyranny and the manipulation of information by specialinterests.
2) Serve the citizens of the world Theglobal journalist s primary loyalty is to the informationneeds of world citizens. Journalists should not seethemselves as attached primarily to factions, regions oreven countries.
3) Promote non-parochialunderstandings
The global journalist frames issuesbroadly and uses a diversity of sources and perspectives ofunderstanding of issues from an international perspective.[43]
Ross Howard, aCanadian journalism instructor and founder of the Media andDemocracy Group in October of 2004wrote:
One doesn t have to be a warcorrespondent to recognize that journalism and news mediacan incite violent conflict. In 1994, Radio Milles Collinesin Rwanda incited gonocide by employing metaphors and hatespeech. Serbian state broadcasting during the 1995 and 1999Balkan conflict is almost equally infamous. Incompetentjournalism and partisan news management can generatemisinformation which inflames xenophobia, ethnic hatred,class warfare and violent conflict in almost any fragilestate. The anti-Thai violence in Cambodia in 2003,triggered entirely by partisan media, is a more recentexample. Radio Netherlands website on counteracting hatemedia indicates that hate radio is currently operating onfive continents." [44]
There are other examples wherejournalists actively select stories in conflict states whichled to reconciliation during South Africa s Truth andReconciliation Commission rather than reporting on somewhich would have further inflamed public discourse. Mediahas the capacity to repeat stereotypes, engage in thedeterioration of the public sphere and create conditionswhich lead to violence in a fragile situation. Or as Howardsuggests, "conflict sensitive journalism can inject context,an appreciation for root causes " [45]
International lawencourages states to introduce legislation which penalizesincitement to hatred. The International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights (ICCPR) in Article 20 and theInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofRacial Discrimination (CERD) have articles which prohibitthese forms of communication.
Article 20 of the ICCPRstates: 1. Any propaganda for warshall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national,racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement todiscrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited bylaw. [46]
Balancing these provisions with theright to freedom of expression as set out in Article 19 ofthe ICCPR or Article 10 of the European Convention of HumanRights has been the subject of much debate in places wherecountries have moved forward with the requisite legislation.Many have made the argument that forcing extremists tomoderate their language actually makes their message morepalatable to the general public. [47]
In countrieswith longstanding disputes such as Israel and Palestine,there have been instances where some right wing Members ofthe Knesset have called for the ethnic transfer of IsraeliArabs or soccer crowds have chanted "Death to the Arabs" atmatches, while in Gaza, there are Hamas rallies where crowdschant "Throw the Jews into the sea." This type of conflictsituation simply creates a cycle of suicide bombings andmilitary attacks undermining the moderate narrative offinding a peaceful solution to the conflict. [48]
The prohibitionof certain forms of public discourse or the failure toimplement these positions into law may contribute to thereplication of hate speech into the public sphere in manyconflict states. Failure to set the boundaries ofacceptable discourse in a public way that is negotiated infull view either organically within the public sphere itselfor through the enactment or enforcement of legislation inextreme cases, there is the possibility that thesenarratives could become normalized in the dominant space ofthe public sphere. It is in these situations where, forexample, conflicts related to ethnic minorities innation-states can lead to ethnic cleansing and other stagesof conflict in the most extreme of circumstances. [49]
In Hungary forexample, I have walked past a newsstand and seen the dailynewspaper have a picture with ten naked women on the coverholding soccer balls. This may be a normative part of thepublic sphere in Eastern Europe for a series of reasons, butCatherine MacKinnon has written that negative portrayals ofwomen: ought to be construed as akind of "wound," because it proclaims and effects thesubordinated status of women. [50]
According to Ross Howard, conflictsensitive journalism begins with an understanding of"essential elements of rudimentary conflictanalysis": Almost all conflictemerges from a handful of causes, most notably inadequatelyshared resources, housing, no communication betweendisputants, unresolved grievances and when no common groundor shared interest can be established. Violencecan emerge in several forms, including cultural practicessuch as widely-practiced (religious or gender)discrimination. The violence can also be institutionalizedby legally sanctioned colonialism, nepotism andcorruption. Conflict almost inevitably endsbecause of one-party dominance, withdrawal and irresolutetransformation of a dispute into a shared solution. Journalists play some of the roles to communities to resolveconflict. Successful resolution almost invariably involvesa number of interests with new interests, trade-offs andalternatives. Journalism risks beingmanipulated by narrow interests and unchallenged mythologiesof elites. A basic analysis of a conflict broadensjournalist insights, perspectives and produces morediverse stories. In acknowledging their innatecapacity as mediators, and applying basic conflict analysisskills they can apply more rigorous scrutiny to the wordsand images they apply in their reporting:
-Avoidingemotional and imprecise words such as massacre and genocide,terrorist or extremist. Call people what they callthemselves. Avoid words like devastated, tragedyetc. -Defining conflicts as multi-faceted, and seekingcommonalities as well as points of tension among disputants,and seeking alternative perspectives and solutions to theconflict -Attributing claims and allegations, andavoiding unsubstantiated descriptions -Avoiding theunjustified use of racial or cultural identities in storiesand exclusion of diversity in seeking perspectives andcomment [50]
Michael Edwards who directs the FordFoundation s Governance and Civil Society programs said in arecent interview that he sees a role for civil society toplay in the development of a robust publicsphere:
The term [civil society] goesback to Aristotle, but dates in contemporary time to thefall of the Berlin Wall. People in Eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union latched into it as they struggled tofind a new vision for their societies. They believed thatindependent citizens can change the world and that freedomand democracy could grow around small circles of dissidents -- an idea that dates to Alexis de Tocqueville. When he cameto America in the 19th century, de Toqueville saw groups ofAmerican citizens coming together voluntarily to fashion anew society in a new world. In the former Soviet bloc,small circles came together, gradually formed wider circlesof resistance, and finally overthrew an authoritarianstate.
But the other meanings of civil society are alsoimportant -- Aristotle s ideal of the "good society," thatcitizens should always be striving to create, and, morerecently, the notion of the "public sphere," in whichcitizens argue about what makes their societies"good."
There s no simple equation. You have to considerthe context and the times. Many people assume that the moreopportunities people have to participate, the better. Rwanda, for example, had Africa s highest density ofvoluntary associations at the time of the genocide. During20 years of civil war, Lebanon had very well-developedvoluntary associations, but many fomented conflict insteadof mitigating it. In the United States, we ve got noshortage of voluntary associations -- a strong environmentallobby, women s rights lobby, gun lobby, and so on, butthey re all focused on a narrow agenda. We have few bridgesacross the lines of party affiliation, race, gender oridentity, and little sense of the common interest. So eventhough single-issue advocacy groups provide routes to publicparticipation, some say they can lead to gridlock in thesystem You almost never hear the words "public sphere"uttered in most discussions about civil society, even thoughit s one of our most important ideas about democracy. Embedded in the idea of the public sphere is the convictionthat, by talking to each other, groups of citizens caninvent a new political consensus. The reality of today,however, is that public discussion is eroded andimpoverished, and the public interest is thereforeimpossible to create and maintain. [51]
There are also a number of otherissues that are relevant in terms of having legitimatedomestic and regional legislation in place related tomediating the public sphere. For example, organizationssuch as OSCE and the European Union have supportedprogressive and independent communications policies such assupporting freedom of information legislation, arms-lengthbroadcasting legislation and by pushing fordecriminalization of defamation and libel for journalists. Added to this are standards to assess the concentration ofmedia ownership and broadcasting councils which can monitorprevalence of hate speech. There are also workable policiesbeing put into place to promote internet usage and trainingso people have access to a greater variety of informationrather than just domestic sources. In transition states,there are numerous examples of states passing the legalframework for the establishment of free media. [52]
In much the sameway that Habermas viewed the Marxist and Frankfurt School ashaving underestimated the importance of universal law,rights and sovereignty in social movements, the role of thepublic sphere was also neglected. Just as in Westerndemocratic societies, transition societies recognize theincreasingly important role of the media in politics, publiclife and in the process of value formation, but also in themanner in which corporate interests have colonized thissphere. The commercial nature of many media companies oftenimplies that this idea of the "commons" is left in the handsof a marketplace as well as defining the dominant themes ofpublic discussion in a given society. It can be argued thatthis almost seems a rational response to the frequentmisuses of state-run media in the region historically.
Many from the Frankfurt School have argued that thepublic sphere has been altered from a place of rationaldebate to one of consumption and passivity. This theme ofthe corporate colonization of the public sphere relates verystrongly to the Gramscian view of hegemony and Althusser smany writings on ideological state apparatuses. [53]
States, underinternational protocols, have an obligation to prevent actsof hatred from occurring due to incitement in the publicsphere. Measures to protect:
individualand collective rights from incitement to hatred includeeducation on tolerance; measures to eliminate discriminationin education, employment, and housing; particular measuresto ensure no discrimination in government bodies or agents,such as the police, or in the judiciary; ombudspersonsempowered to receive and act on any complaints; and rigorousinvestigation and punishment of all crimes motivated byracial, religious and national hatred. [54]
Hate speech and incitement in thepublic sphere has been the subject of much debate in placessuch as Israel where Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was slainby a right wing extremist in 1995. In the years followingthe signing of the Oslo Peace Process, the Israeli PrimeMinister had become the target of the extreme right inIsrael in the public sphere. Judith Butler haswritten:
We began by noting that hatespeech calls into question linguistic survival, that beingcalled a name can be the site of injury, and conclude bynoting that this name-calling may be the initiating momentof counter-mobilization. The name one is called bothsubordinates and enables, producing a scene of agency fromambivalence, a set of effects that exceed the animatingintentions of the call. To take up the name that one iscalled is no simple submission to prior authority, for thename is already unmoored from prior context, and enteredinto labor of self-definition. The word that wounds becomesan instrument of resistance in the redeployment thatdestroys the prior territory of its operation. [55]
In the specific instance of mediaincited and sustained mass violence, the internationalcommunity and regional bodies are still developing the bestpractices of media intervention in weak or failing conflictstates. Broad questions of what an imposed 'peace media could mean in such environments need to be analyzedobjectively due to the fact that they bring up some of thesame colonial themes that have been criticized for much ofthe 20th Century. On the other hand, actions such asjamming radio signals and taking interventionist action willalways be viewed with concern. [55]
On December 23,2003, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found that "Ferdinand Nahimana, founder and ideologist ofthe Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM),Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, high ranking board member of theComite d initiative of the RTLM and founding member of theCoalition for the Defense of Republic (CDR), and HassanNgeze, chief editor of Kangura newspaper, were convictedtoday for genocide, incitement to genocide, conspiracy, andcrimes against humanity, extermination and persecution." [56]
The ICTR, inexamining the role of radio station RTLM and the newspaperKangura, reached a similar conclusion to the InternationalMilitary Tribunal against the Nazi journalist JuliusStreicher on the charge of inciting genocide. The 1948 UNGenocide Convention still serves as a primary element in thepresent day interpretation of international criminaljustice. [57]
In thecase of Rwanda, the state controlled radio station wasalready sending a violently pro-Hutu message when moderatestook over the Ministry of Information. In 1993, Hutuhardliners incorporated radio station RTLM in response tothe moderates and began broadcasting despite the governmentban on "harmful state propaganda." This new stationbroadcasted on the same frequency as the state-owned RadioRwanda, had formal links with state agencies and includedsome of the same personnel. The political and militaryelite supported RTLM as part of a broader strategy to thwartinternal democratic reforms. The government alsodistributed free radios to give people access to RTLM. After the death of the President in a plane crash, thegenocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus began. The stationdeveloped a spontaneous style, and along with Radio Rwandaand the newspaper Kangura, openly led incitations toslaughter with directions on how to carry it out. [58]
Even thoughGeneral Romeo Dallaire called for a jamming of the radiostation, he could not get approval from the UN. Due partlyto an earlier failure in an intervention in Somalia, the USargued that radio jamming constituted an act of interferenceand was therefore a violation of international law. RTLMcontinued to use populist rhetoric and broadcasted names,addresses and license plates of Tutsi targets. [59]
In Serbia,Slobodan Milosevic ascended to the leadership of the SerbianLeague of Communists by publishing a Memorandum which listedSerb grievances and stoked feelings of Serb nationalism. Milosevic met with the head of Belgrade Radio-Televisionevery day. According to one account, hewas:
Exploiting control over theairwaves and printing presses in Serbia, Milosevic s mediamachine sought to persuade ethnic Serbs that they facedimminent danger from their fellow citizens in other formerYugoslav republics and provinces. Incessant chauvinisticdemands broadcast by the media undermined the principles ofnational equality cultivated for decades by Marshal Tito. The hysteric nationalist mythology churned out by theSerbian media after 1987 fuelled nationalist sentiment amongother ethnic and religious communities. [60]
Milosevic in 1987, after returning toKosovo said, "What we are discussing here can no longer becalled politics, it is a question of our fatherland." Inthis way, he was able to use state resources to build asense of a "Greater Serbia." The media of that period mademany uses of past conflicts including references to theSecond World War. Some observers from that period havenoted that these historical moments were being manipulatedfor the purposes of precipitating another war. Some of thefootage was dubbed with music such as Dire Strait s"Brothers in Arms." Other images such as the ones from theSecond World War were used to discredit NATO intervention. Another station which was a supporter of Bosnian Serb leaderRadovan Karadzik, mixed footage between Nazi soldiers andNATO forces to draw inferences between the two. In arelatively short space of time, all sides of the conflictwere well versed in propaganda techniques. [61]
Violent conflictis rarely exclusively a result of inflammatory media, but itcertainly plays an important role in fomenting popularsupport for normalizing such an action. In the instance ofstate failure common in the post-Cold War era, it is definedas the inability of a state to "uphold an effective monopolyof violence over its whole territory, a failure to upholdthe law, an inability to meet international obligations suchas debt repayment and the use of its territory for theperpetration of violence." [62]
Often times, thiscoincides with the state s inability to supply basic publicservices. In all of these types of situations, many NGO sspecializing in communications including Article 19 andInternews, support the training of journalists, support forindependent media, and the monitoring of local mediacontent. According to the Sarai Journal, there are threetypes of possible intervention: 1) Structural interventions (support for independentmedia and diversity in media ownership, journalismtraining, legislative interventions to protect privatemedia outlets and address hateful and antagonistic content,cooperation with international media networks as well asNGO s to complement and monitor local media outlets), andaggressive interventions (using force or prohibiting mediaoutlets from operating).
2) Content Specific Interventions(directly addressing the content produced by mediaoutlets).
3) Aggressive Interventions (using force orprohibiting media outlets from operating). [63]
Added to these intervention options isthe emergence of new forms of diplomacy which are bothinternational and regional in their scope. They are widelyknown in terms such as 'new diplomacy, new internationalism,new institutionalism and cooperative mulilateralism. Atits core, it places the interests of humanity before theinterests of nation states by working with and mobilizingcitizen groups "to rally public opinion within and betweennation-states." Some examples of the successes of thisapproach include the Ottawa Landmines Treaty, theInternational Criminal Court, passage of the "responsibilityto protect" doctrine at the United Nations and theConvention on Cultural Diversity adopted by UNESCO andothers like the Kyoto Protocol. [64]
Even though thereare troubling signs such as the mass killings in the Darfurregion of Sudan where the international community chose notto intervene in the early stages despite visits by then USSecretary of State Colin Powell prior to the slaughteroccurring, the latest studies indicate that the amount ofarmed conflicts are actually decreasing in the world. Andrew Mack, former Director of Strategic Planning underKofi Annan at the UN and currently with UBC s Liu Institutefor Global Issues, released the Human Security Report inOctober 2005 which showed that wars are not becoming morefrequent or more deadly, nor is terrorism the main threat tohuman security. The gravest threat is in fact in knowntrouble spots where the UN is not actively involved inintervening in conflict prevention, peacemaking orpeacebuilding. [65]
Vaclav Havel has written extensively about the need forsocieties to be structured around the freedom of theindividual and that the citizenry should be actively engagedas part of the development of society. Even in thisrespect, transition states need to develop standards for thestructure of the public sphere in such a manner that it doesnot reinforce negative stereotypes which are out of the normof international and domestic standards of public discourse.This relationship between freedom and responsibility isrelated very closely to what Habermas calls rational publicdebate. In the case of transition states, there is the muchmore complicated question of how to proceed with thisprocess of reinvention. [66]
The Hungariandissident and thinker Istvan Bibo wrote that "To be ademocrat is to not be afraid." [67] Just as AlbertCamus explored in the themes of The Rebel, John Ralston Saulalso points out: Equilibrium, inthe Western experience, is dependent not just on criticism,but on non-conformism in the public place. The road awayfrom the illusions of ideology towards reality is passableonly if that anti-conformism makes full use of our qualitiesand strengths in order to maintain the tension ofuncertainty. The examined life makes a virtue ofuncertainty. It celebrates doubt. [68]
While the European Union and theinstitutions it created were built as entities to preventanother war from occurring, it did not initially have asecurity focus. With the signing of the Treaty ofMaastricht in 1992 which called for further cooperation anda commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy. TheEuropean Constitutional Treaty of 2004, which still requiresthe formal approval of member states, has led to developmentof a Security Strategy and the initiation of the EuropeanDefense Agency. The Balkan Wars exposed many of theweaknesses of the European Union in terms of its ability torespond to regional matters. The expansion itself is afurther indication that the European Union remains arelevant force for establishing stability in some transitionstates. As the European Union expands its role, there willbe a need to integrate with the existing roles of the UN,NATO and OSCE. There will remain the tension in thisenvironment for EU member states to want to have a commonapproach while others will strive to maintain nationalsovereignty over foreign affairs. [69]
Recently on thewebsite Reinventing Central Europe, Elemer Hankissdescribed some of the deficiencies in Hungary s publicsphere as the following: political parties have monopolized the spheres of decisionmaking, and the space of public debate; institutions and channels facilitating public participationdo not exist or are far too weak; people areunaware of the fact that they have the right, and have toacquire the means, to shape their own future and protecttheir interests; apart from lobbyists in theeconomic sector, the majority of society is relegated intopolitical passivity, and in fact, as a mater of historiclegacy, is itself inclined toward passivity. However, undercertain circumstances this same passive society can becomeovernight able and willing to mobilize itself and takeaction. Hungarians were active not only in the streetfighting of the 1956 revolution but also in the reformprocess of the late 1980's, and the peaceful revolution of1989. [70] In this type of evolvingenvironment, the European Union is developing capabilitiesof not only signing Association Agreements with neighboringstates, funding civil society in transition states, but alsodeveloping their instruments to apply pressure externallywhere state failure and distortions of the public sphere area matter of broader international concern. The developmentof these regional and international mechanisms working withlocally based civil society organizations should bolster theability of these institutions to take pre-emptive actionagainst states which veer from the norm of internationalconventions and which threaten regional stability. By beingable to objectively monitor distortions in the public sphereand state apparatuses, there may be greater opportunitiesfor productive engagement and capacity development. Additionally, developing better standards of communicationpolicy and monitoring methods through regional andinternational bodies, the European Union and regionalnation-states can integrate in a more holistic manner with amore common framework of engagement in coordination with theUnited Nations. Concepts such as Global PublicGoods developed by the UNDP provide a great startingpoint around which transition states can articulate the needfor basic standards in their societies. [71]
The EuropeanUnion will particularly be challenged in the coming years ontheir relationship to regional Muslim countries and willneed to develop a framework for constructive engagement. Aswell, the development of structures and systems could beopen to legitimate criticism as being too western and notresponsive to the nuances of particular regions. Anyattempts to elevate the public sphere must have support fromwithin societies.
In the end, a vibrant public sphereneeds to be organically developed, be robust with sufficientbarriers to withstand deformations which could see extremeviews enter the mainstream and have responsibilitiesattached to the freedoms it provides as a space of publicdiscourse in democratic societies where open discussion anda life of civic interplay can be nurtured in a free way. The space between legitimate and illegitimate dissent in afree society will always be a moving target in the sensethat it is a space of constant negotiation and will often bedependent on the mainstream support such actions canreceive. Since post-modernism is largely built on therejection of meta-narratives, there will certainly be spacecreated for marginalized narratives which attempt topenetrate the mainstream. By strengthening norms andstandards, the culture of a public sphere as part of freeand open societies can be cultivated in transition stateswhich can enhance the possibilities of long term stabilityand enhance their role in an interconnected global publicsphere. A rich and diverse public sphere should be viewedas a foundation for developing a stable, deliberative modelof democracy.
********
END NOTES
1 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 70. 2 Howard, Ross. Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Practise. (www.journalismethics.ca, October, 2005). 3 Saul, JohnRalson. The Unconscious Civilization. (Toronto: House ofAnansi, 1995), pg. 11. 4 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins ofTotalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg. 35. 5Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg. 189. 6 Arendt, Hannah. The Originsof Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg.340. 7 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg. 420. 8 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968),pg. 383. 9 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins ofTotalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg. 421. 10Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg. 478. 11 Saul, John Ralston. OnEquilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 14. 12 Saul,John Ralston. The Unconscious Civilization. (Toronto:Anansi, 1995), pg. 133. 13 Cahn, Stephen. PoliticalPhilosophy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) pg.530. 14 Cahn, Stephen. Political Philosophy. (New York:Oxford Univesity Press, 2005) pg. 531. 15 Saul, JohnRalston. The Unconscious Civilization. (Toronto: Anansi,1995), pg. 194. 16 Cahn, Stephen. Political Philosophy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pg. 530. 17Saul, John Ralston. The Unconscious Civilization. (Toronto: Anansi, 1995), pg. 194. 18 Wright, Ronald. AShort History of Progress. (Toronto: Anansi, 2004), pg.4. 19 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt, 1968), pg. 348. 20 Wright, Ronald. A Short History of Progress. (Toronto: Anansi, 2004), pg.6. 21 Wright, Ronald. A Short History of Progress. (Toronto: Anansi, 2004), pg. 71. 22 Cahn, Stephen. Political Philosophy. (New York: Oxford University Press,2005), pg. 531. 23 Alexander, Jeffrey C. et al. CulturalTrauma and Collective Identity. (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press), pg. 67. 24 Alexander, Jeffrey C. etal. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 9. 25 Alexander,Jeffrey C. et al. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 131. 26Alexander, Jeffrey C. et. al. Cultural Trauma andCollective Identity. (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress), pg. 223. 27 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin), pg. 195. 28 Alexander, Jeffrey C.et. al. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 155. 29Alexander, Jeffrey C. et. al. Cultural Trauma andCollective Identity. (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress), pp. 156-57. 30 Alexander, Jeffrey C. et. al. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 157. 31 Alexander,Jeffrey C. et. al. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity.(Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 157. 32Cahn, Stephen. Political Philosophy. (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005), pg. 436-72. 33 Alexander,Jeffrey C. et. al. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity.(Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 175. 34Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin,2001), pg. 14. 35 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 15. 36 Saul, JohnRalston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg.91. 37 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 79. 38 Saul, John Ralston. OnEquilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 81. 39 Saul,John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001),pg. 199. 40 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 230. 41 Saul, JohnRalston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg.241. 42 Ward, Stephen. Global Journalism Ethics. Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 79. 38 Saul,John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001),pg. 81. 39 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 199. 40 Saul, JohnRalston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg.230. 41 Saul, John Ralston. On Equilibrium. (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pg. 241. 42 Ward, Stephen. GlobalJournalism Ethics. (www.journalismethics.ca), 2005. 43Ward, Stephen. Global Journalism Ethics. (www.journalismethics.ca), 2005. 44 Howard, Ross. Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Practice. (www.journalismethics.ca), 2005. 45 Howard, Ross. Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Practice. (www.journalismethics.ca), 2005. 46 Darbishire, Helen. Hate Speech: new European perspective. (www.errc.org),2005. 47 Darbishire, Helen. Hate Speech: new Europeanperspective. (www.err.org), 2005. 48 Racism in IsraelReport. www.mossawacenter.org, 2005. 49 Howard, Ross. Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Practice. (www.journalismethics.ca), 2005. 50 Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech. (New York: Routledge, 1997), pg.73. 50 Howard, Ross. Conflict Sensitive Journalism inPractice. (www.journalismethics.ca), 2005. 51 FordFoundation Report. Interview with Michael Edwards. (www.fordfound.org/publications). 53 Cahn, Stephen. Political Philosophy. (New York: Oxford University Press,2005), pg. 533. 54 Darbishire, Helen. Hate Speech: newEuropean perspective. (www.errc.org), 2005 71717155Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech. (New York: Routledge,1997), pg. 163. 55 Sarai Reader. InterventionistJournalism in Times of Crisis. (www.sarai.net/journal),2004. 56 Sarai Reader. Interventionist Media in Times ofCrisis. (www.sarai.net/journal), 2004. 57 Sarai Reader. Interventionist Media in Times of Crisis. (www.sarai.net/journal), 2004. 58 Internews. Media inConflict. (www.internews.org), 2006. 59 Sarai Journal. Interventionist Media in Times of Crisis. (www.sarai.net/journal), 2004. 60 Internews. Case Study -- Former Republic of Yugoslavia. (www.internews.org),2006. 61 Internews. Case Study -- Former Republic ofYugoslavia. (www.internews.org), 2006. 62 Alexander,Jeffrey C. et. al. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity.(Berkeley: University of California Press), pg. 175. 63Sarai Journal. Interventionist Media in Times of Crisis. (www.sarai.net/journal), 2004. 64 Glavin, Terry. Reinventing Diplomacy. (Vancouver: Georgia Straight), Jan.12th -- 19th, 2006. 65 Glavin, Terry. ReinventingDiplomacy. (Vancouver: Georgia Straight), Jan. 12th -- 19th,2006. 66 Cahn, Stephen. Political Philosophy. (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2005), pg. 531. 67 Bibo,Istvan. ISES READER: ISTVAN BIBO SEMINAR. 68 Saul, JohnRalston. The Unconscious Civilization. (Toronto: Anansi,1995), pg.194. 69 International Crisis Group. TheEuropean Union, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management.January 2006. 70 Hankiss, Elemer. Elemer Hankiss: TheDemocratic Puzzle. (http://www.talaljuk-ki.hu/index.php/article/articleview/193/1/18/),2006. 71 Kaul, Inge. Global Public Goods. http://www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/Executive_Summary/executive_summary.html#introduction,2006.
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